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Abstract 
Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is an anxiety disorder that can occur in response 
to traumatic experiences. Research has shown that the trauma memory may become central to 
a survivor’s life story and result in a trauma-centred identity. Posttraumatic changes to identity 
vary across cultures. Trauma-centred identity has been found to be positively associated with 
PTSD symptoms in individualistic cultures, but not in collectivistic cultures. Cultural 
differences have also been observed in levels of self-consistency. Individualistic cultures value 
high levels of consistency, whereas collectivistic cultures promote identity flexibility and 
adaptation to different social contexts. Several PTSD models describe the involvement of self-
consistency in posttraumatic coping, but research to date has yet to examine cultural variations 
in self-consistency and their relation to trauma-centred identity and PTSD.   
The present study investigated the relationships between self-consistency, trauma-
centred identity and posttraumatic symptoms across cultures. Trauma survivors from 
individualistic (n= 60 British) and collectivistic (n= 37 Soviets) cultures completed the 
Centrality of Events Scale, a self-consistency measure, and provided self-defining memories 
and self-cognitions. Trauma-centred identity was positively associated with posttraumatic 
symptoms in both cultural groups. Self-consistency was negatively associated with trauma-
centred identity in the two groups, and with posttraumatic symptoms in the Soviet culture. 
Mediation analyses indicated that levels of self-consistency mediated the impact of trauma-
centeredness on the development of PTSD. It can be concluded that, following trauma, self-
consistency appears to be protective for British and Soviets. The clinical implications of the 
present finding, particularly the benefits of self-consistency in the treatment of clients from 
British and Soviet cultures, are discussed.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is an anxiety disorder that can develop in the 
aftermath of trauma. Several of the dominant theoretical models of PTSD highlight the role of 
the self, and various ways the self may be influenced by traumatic experiences, in the 
development and maintenance of PTSD (e.g., Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Ehlers & 
Clark, 2000; Jobson, 2009; Rubin, Berntsen, & Bohni, 2008). A prominent idea, supported by 
empirical findings, is that the memory of the trauma may become a cornerstone of one’s life 
story (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). This may lead to a self or an identity that is centred 
round the traumatic experience. Levels of trauma-centred identity have been found to be 
associated with PTSD symptoms. These results have been found repeatedly, using different 
methods of identity assessment, in clinical and non-clinical participants from Western, 
individualistic populations (e.g., Berntsen & Rubin, 2004). However, emerging evidence 
suggests that individuals with PTSD from non-Western, collectivistic populations do not 
display higher levels of trauma-centred identity (e.g., Jobson & O’Kearney, 2008). Such 
findings suggest cultural differences in posttraumatic changes to identity. 
Identity consistency, also referred to as self-consistency, is defined as a congruent view 
of the self (Boucher, 2011). High levels of self-consistency have been shown to relate to, and 
predict, psychological well-being (e.g., Donahue, Robins, Roberts, & John, 1993). It has been 
hypothesised that self-consistency needs are involved in posttraumatic coping, particularly 
concerning the incongruence of the trauma with non-trauma aspects of the self (Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Jobson, 2009; Rubin et al., 2008). A number of 
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PTSD models regard the need for self-consistency as leading to changes to survivors’ identity 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Jobson, 2009; Rubin et al., 2008). Yet the nature of the 
relationships between self-consistency, the centrality of the trauma to identity and the eventual 
development of PTSD, had received little theoretical and empirical attention.   
Cross-cultural research has provided evidence for cultural differences in the desired 
levels of self-consistency. Maintaining a consistent sense of self across relationships and social 
contexts is normative and valued in Western, individualistic cultures. Non-Western, 
collectivistic cultures have a different perception of self-consistency, whereby one is expected 
to be flexible and adaptive to different situations, and thus, being highly self-consistent is 
viewed as a marker of arrogance or immaturity (e.g., Suh, 2002). Therefore, the evidence 
points to cultural differences in the desired levels of self-consistency and in posttraumatic 
changes in identity. It is necessary to investigate these cultural differences to enable a better 
understanding of the relationships between self-consistency levels, the development of trauma-
centred identity and PTSD, as well as to provide culturally-appropriate models of PTSD.  
This introductory chapter begins with a brief description of the diagnostic and clinical 
characteristics of PTSD.  Next, contemporary cognitive theories of PTSD are described. The 
literature on the relationship between PTSD and trauma-centred identity is reviewed, followed 
by a description of the self and theories of self-consistency with relation to cultural differences 
and PTSD. Finally, the chapter concludes with a description of the rationale and research 
questions for this study.  
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1.2 Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
1.2.1 Definition and diagnosis. 
Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is an anxiety disorder that affects a significant 
proportion of those who experience trauma. Events considered as traumas include combat, 
torture, accidents, assault, rape, life threatening illness and natural disasters. The diagnosis of 
PTSD is characterised by three symptom clusters: re-experiencing, avoidance and 
hyperarousal. Re-experiencing symptoms are unwanted and repetitive flashbacks, nightmares, 
memories, reliving of the trauma and emotional and bodily reactions to trauma reminders. 
Avoidance and numbing symptoms include efforts to escape the thoughts, places and 
behaviours associated with the event, difficulties to remember or discuss the trauma, a 
diminished interest in previously enjoyable activities and emotional numbing or lack of 
positive emotions toward others. Hyper-arousal symptoms consist of hyper-vigilance, 
increased startle response, difficulties concentrating, poor sleep, irritability and bursts of anger 
(American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2000). 
1.2.2 Prevalence rates, chronicity and costs of PTSD. 
Lifetime exposure to trauma has been found to range from 69-81% (e.g., de Vries & 
Olff, 2009; Norris, 1992; Stein, Walker, Hazen, & Forde, 1997). The majority of survivors 
display symptoms of PTSD in the initial period following the trauma, but for many of them 
these symptoms vanish spontaneously within three to six months (Foa & Riggs, 1995). Around 
25% of trauma survivors develop PTSD (Green, 1994), and 74% of people diagnosed with 
PTSD experience symptoms for more than six months (Breslau, 2001). 
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Trauma and PTSD are documented throughout the world. PTSD is increasingly being 
observed in most societies and cultures (Figueira et al., 2007; Foa, Keane, Friedman, & Cohen, 
2009). The evidence on the prevalence of trauma exposure and PTSD across ethnicities and 
cultures is mixed. Roberts, Gilman, Breslau, Breslau, and Koenen’s (2011) comprehensive 
study found that 84% of White Americans were exposed to potentially traumatic events, 
compared with 66% of Asian Americans. Of those, 7.4% of the former and 4% of the latter 
developed PTSD during the course of their life. Similar lifetime prevalence rates of PTSD 
have been reported in Western populations (e.g., 6.8% in North Americans; Kessler, Berglund, 
Demler, Merikangas, & Walters, 2005). Although higher prevalence rates have been 
documented in non-Western cultures, they often pertain to post-conflict populations, such as 
refugees (e.g., Hinton et al., 2006) and internally displaced people (Thapa & Hauff, 2005). 
One study that compared posttraumatic reactions to similar events across different cultures 
found comparable prevalence rates of PTSD in Kenyans and Americans (North et al., 2005).  
Posttraumatic responses carry a heavy social and financial burden. PTSD is associated 
with health risks, illness and social and occupational problems (Green & Kimerling, 2004; 
Lauterbach, Vora, & Rakow, 2005). Often, trauma survivors seek help from non-psychiatric 
medical services for a host of physical conditions, either instead or alongside mental health 
services (Rauch et al., 2009). PTSD is associated with workplace costs, especially lost 
productivity (Greenberg et al., 1999). In the United States, the annual expenditure of lost 
productivity due to PTSD was $3 billion (Kessler, 2000) and the annual mental health 
spending for trauma-related crime was $166.5 billion (Solomon & Davidson, 1997). 
Altogether, PTSD is a debilitating condition, reported in one in four trauma survivors, and 
associated with grave social and economic costs.   
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1.2.3 Comorbidity of PTSD and other conditions. 
There is a high comorbidity for PTSD and other health conditions. Individuals with 
PTSD are more than twice as likely to suffer physical health conditions compared to those 
without PTSD, even when age, socioeconomic status and depression are accounted for 
(Kimerling, 2004). Further evidence suggests that PTSD mediates the association between 
trauma exposure and the negative impacts on physical health (Schnurr & Green, 2004). PTSD 
is associated with a unique disregulation of the immune system, a condition that is related to 
chronic physiological and mental stress (Altemus, Dhabhar, & Yang, 2006). In veterans, there 
is evidence that the severity of PTSD symptoms predicts health problems at 18-24 months 
(Wagner, Wolfe, Rotnitsky, Proctor, & Erickson, 2000). According to the World Health 
Organization’s Global Burden of Disease (2004), PTSD costs 3.5 million years of healthy life 
worldwide.  
Alongside the increased physical health risk, nearly 80% of people with PTSD meet the 
diagnostic criteria for additional mental health disorders (Helzer & Pryzbeck, 1988; Solomon 
& Davidson, 1997). PTSD usually predates the comorbid condition and is associated with 
having a history of mental illness (Kessler et al., 1995). The co-existence of PTSD and 
depression is especially high. A national comorbidity study reported that 47.9% of PTSD 
sufferers had comorbid Major Depression, compared with 11.7% of those without PTSD 
(Kessler et al., 1995). Shalev et al. (1998) reported similar comorbidity rates one month and 
four months after the traumatic incident. The comorbidity of PTSD and depression is 
associated with increased severity of symptoms and with decreased levels of functioning 
(Shalev et al., 1998). An extensive, epidemiologic study by Breslau et al. (2000) suggests a 
shared vulnerability to PTSD and depression in trauma victims. Given that PTSD is the more 
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common primary diagnosis when the two co-occur, Kessler et al. (1995) speculated that PTSD 
instigates depression. Additional disorders found to have high rates of comorbidity with PTSD 
are substance misuse, obsessive compulsive disorder and panic disorder (Kessler et al., 1995). 
In summary, trauma survivors often endure occupational, economic, physical and 
mental health difficulties in addition to PTSD. Thus, PTSD sufferers often demand high levels 
of resources from the health care system (Solomon & Davidson, 1997). 
1.3 Psychological Models of PTSD 
Conceptual models of PTSD have drawn on socio-cognitive (e,g., Horowitz, 1976; 
Janoff-Bulman, 1992), conditioning (e.g., Keane, Zimering, & Caddell, 1985), information processing 
(e.g., Foa, Steketee, & Rothbaum, 1989) and emotional processing (Foa & Riggs, 1993; Foa & 
Rothbaum, 1998) theories. These were described by Brewin and Holmes (2003). Other models 
draw attention to the trauma memory and identity. These latter theories relate more closely to 
the variables examined in the present investigation. These models and their relevance to the 
current study are discussed below.  
1.3.1 Dual representation theory (DRT).  
A fundamental premise of the DRT (Brewin et al., 1996; Brewin & Holmes, 2003) 
regards trauma memories in PTSD as fundamentally different to ordinary memories. 
According to DRT, trauma memories are kept in two distinct and parallel memory systems. 
Memories that are stored in the Verbally Accessible Memory system (VAM) are integrated 
with other autobiographical information and can be intentionally summoned. They are verbal 
or written accounts of what was consciously noticed during and after the traumatic event. They 
also contain the primary and secondary emotions that were felt during and after the trauma. 
  
7 
 
Differently, perceptual information from the trauma which was noticed too briefly to be 
consciously registered is encoded and analyzed in a Situationally Accessible Memory system 
(SAM). In this perceptual processing, events are not stored verbally, but rather, as sensory and 
somatic memories. SAM memories can be very powerful, as they often elicit the primary 
emotions that were felt during the trauma, for instance, fear (Brewin & Holmes, 2003). The 
DRT hypothesises that in PTSD, the SAM takes over and repeatedly brings emotional and 
perceptual elements of the trauma experience into consciousness. Memories in SAM are 
sensory rather than verbal, and therefore, they are difficult to describe, and often remain 
unintegrated with and uninformed by other autobiographical knowledge (Brewin & Holmes, 
2003). Flashbacks, a hallmark symptom of PTSD, are hypothesised to be stored in SAM, as 
they are highly emotional and involuntarily triggered. Intrusive trauma memories, another core 
PTSD symptom, also share similarities with SAM memories, as they are often fragmented, 
chronologically disorganized and involve sensory-perceptual components (Brewin, 2011; 
Brewin et al., 1996; Foa, Molnar, & Cashman, 1995; Jelinek, Randjbar, Seifert, Kellner, & 
Moritz, 2009; Jones, Harvey, & Brewin, 2007).  
Brewin (2001) outlined neurological processes that provide evidence for the DRT. 
They involve the amygdala, a brain structure associated with hard-wired reactions to danger, 
and the hippocampus, an important structure for creating coherent and integrated memories. 
Trauma information is transported to the amygdala via hippocampal and non-hippocampal 
neural circuits. Hippocampal pathways are hypothesised to be related to the VAM system 
because they are associated with well-integrated, consistent and intentional memories. 
Memories stored in the hippocampus have temporal information that locates them in the past 
(Kesner, 1998), similarly to VAM memories. Information that is transported via non-
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hippocampal pathways is associated with the SAM system, because it tends to be unintegrated 
with other existing information and it may be triggered automatically by perceptual cues. Non-
hippocampal memories lack temporal context, and much like SAM memories, they are 
experienced as if they were happening at present (Brewin, 2001). 
In terms of therapy, the dual existence of the trauma memory in two memory systems 
requires interventions in both VAM and SAM. In the VAM, treatment includes a conscious 
reappraisal of the event, so that the trauma memory becomes integrated, and less conflicting, 
with previously existing beliefs. Another component of therapy aims to construe  new and less 
emotionally-laden SAMs to obstruct the original ones (Brewin, 1989; Brewin & Holmes, 
2003).   
1.3.2 The schematic, propositional, analogue and associative representation 
(SPAARS) model. 
 The SPAARS model (Dalgleish, 1999; Dalgleish, 2004) proposes that in PTSD, there 
is a problematic discrepancy, or inconsistency, between the trauma memory and one’s pre-
trauma schemas. Like the DRT (Brewin et al., 1996), it regards the trauma memory as 
qualitatively different to non-trauma memories.  
The SPAARS describes four levels of mental representation. These levels overlap with 
other cognitive models of PTSD. The schematic level resembles the concept of schemas and 
represents abstract, generic knowledge. The propositional level is similar to VAM and 
represents referential meaning in verbal, narrative form. With some resemblance to SAM, the 
analogical level processes memories as sensory and proprioceptive images accompanied by 
non-verbal information. Finally, the associative level connects information from the other 
three levels, similar to the fear network theory by Foa, Steketee, and Rothbaum (1989). The 
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former three levels encode new information and function as working memory where active 
information is manipulated. Referential information, such as thoughts and visual images, is 
processed in the propositional and analogical levels, and is then integrated at the schematic 
level to a consistent schematic sense of an entire event. Information processing is governed by 
the presently dominant schema, and thus, information that is congruent with the dominant 
schema is preferred. 
According to SPAARS, emotions are generated in two ways. Information processed at 
the schematic level generates emotions that are in line with future goals. A second type is that 
of automatically-generated emotions that result from previous emotional experiences. 
Traumatic events generate goal-driven emotions, for example, fear may be generated if the 
goal of safety is threatened. Information about these events is encoded in the first three levels 
and is linked by the associative level. 
PTSD symptoms may develop when traumatic events are continually appraised as 
threatening and as inconsistent with previous schemas. Re-experiencing symptoms occur 
when trauma-related information enters awareness. Hyper-arousal symptoms are associated 
with the constant activation of the fear association and its sense of danger. This leads to 
processing biases in favour of trauma-related information that trigger the trauma 
representations and lead to more intrusions. The trauma representations are linked across the 
different levels, but are not integrated with existing information. Therefore, triggers that are 
related to discrete aspects of the trauma activate the whole trauma network. Attempts to 
protect the self from these uncomfortable experiences ultimately lead to avoidance symptoms.  
The model acknowledges the importance of individual differences in the types of 
dominant pre-trauma schemas, and whether they remain dominant post-trauma. 
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Therapeutically, SPAARS suggests that the resolution of PTSD symptoms requires change at 
the propositional and analogical levels. New meanings may then be generated at the higher, 
schematic level,  to resolve the discrepancy between the trauma and pre-trauma schemas 
(Dalgleish, 1999; Dalgleish, 2004). While the multilevel nature of SPAARS may enhance its 
explanatory potential, the model is criticized for being overly complex and challenging to use 
and to test empirically (Power, 2005). 
1.3.3 The self-memory system (SMS). 
The SMS (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) is a cognitive model of autobiographical 
memory which, like the models described above, conceptualises the trauma memory in PTSD 
as different to non-trauma memories. The SMS has two main elements: an autobiographical 
memory knowledge base and a working self. The autobiographical memory knowledge base 
consists of three levels of knowledge specificity: lifetime periods (e.g., “when I was at 
school”), general events (e.g., “playing basketball”) and event-specific knowledge (e.g., 
specific details of an incident, including images and emotions). Autobiographical memories 
are specific patterns of activity across the knowledge levels. The second element, the working 
self, draws on Baddeley’s (1986) working memory as a set of control processes that organize 
and modify other systems. In SMS, it is defined as a complex hierarchy of goals and sub-goals, 
connected by positive and negative feedback loops (Carver & Scheier, 1982; 1998). The 
working self encodes autobiographical knowledge and coordinates new information to reduce 
inconsistency between desired goals and the present state. Consequently, the working self has 
a crucial role in the construction of memories in the process of remembering. 
More recently (Conway, Meares, & Standart, 2004), the conceptual self was introduced 
within the SMS as a system that recognizes “socially- constructed schema and categories that 
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define the self, other people, and typical interactions with the surrounding world… drawn from 
the influences of familiar and peer socialization, schooling and religion, as well as the stories, 
fairy-tales, myths and media influences that are constitutive of an individual’s culture” 
(Conway, 2005, p.597). The conceptual self is independent of temporally defined knowledge, 
and can activate autobiographical information linked with self concepts. Therefore, the 
conceptual self, alongside the working self, controls and regulates autobiographical 
remembering.   
The SMS suggests that in PTSD, trauma memories are not integrated in long-term 
autobiographical knowledge, and instead, their encoding is strongly associated with the goals 
of the working self. Consequently, the trauma memory remains an uncontextualised episodic 
experience, highly accessible and intrusive. Reminders of trauma-related goals (e.g., to be 
safe) may bring the destabilizing trauma memories actively into consciousness (Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Without the autobiographical context, there is no signal to the survivor 
that the trauma is being remembered, as opposed to being experienced, and symptoms of re-
experiencing may then follow (Conway, Meares, & Standart, 2004). Environmental triggers 
(i.e., event-specific knowledge) can elicit trauma memories directly, because these memories 
have not been integrated in the long-term autobiographical memory which normally impedes 
direct access to episodic memories. These highly accessible trauma memories demand goal 
change, and so their activation is followed by inhibition, resulting in symptoms of avoidance 
(Ehlers & Clark, 2000).   
Correspondence and coherence are important processes in the SMS. Correspondence 
aims to keep an accurate record of reality, and is seen as having evolutional sources (e.g., the 
knowledge that lions pose a threat; Conway et al., 2004). Coherence, also known as self-
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coherence or self-consistency, aims to maintain consistency between memories and present 
goals, self perceptions and beliefs (Conway, 2005; Greenwald, 1980). Coherence is involved 
in encoding, remembering and re-encoding, so that beliefs and knowledge are confirmed by 
matching memories. Coherence generally helps to maintain current goals. Goal maintenance is 
desirable because goal change requires subsequent changes to other goals, overall a taxing 
process. Thus, the working self aims to minimize the appearance of memories which may 
challenge or threat the coherence of the self system. It may distort such threatening memories 
as a way of prioritizing those that meet current goals. Hence, individuals tend to retain 
memories that correspond with their working self goals and to alter information which requires 
goal change (Conway, 2005). To a certain extent, coherence between the trauma and the 
conceptual self may be accomplished through inhibition or distortion of the trauma memory 
(Conway, 2005). Over time, these inconsistencies are too psychologically demanding, and may 
result with transformations to the existing self-schema. In PTSD, these schema modifications 
often emphasize victimhood or changes to the self following the trauma (Conway, 2005).  
One criticism of the SMS involves the hypothesised schema modifications. The model 
described changes to the self in PTSD, but trauma-themed self-schemas, and their specific 
causations, require further elaboration. In addition, the SMS regards coherence needs, but 
individual differences in self-consistency levels and their implications for PTSD are not 
accounted for.   
1.3.4 Ehlers and Clark’s model. 
Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) cognitive appraisal model of PTSD builds on Brewin et al’s 
(1996) premise: the trauma memory is inadequately integrated in autobiographical memory. 
Ehlers and Clark’s model refers to theories of classical conditioning to explain how trauma 
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reminders become exceptionally associated with future danger. These associations lead to 
strong perceptual priming, defined as an unusually low perceptual threshold for stimuli 
associated with the trauma. That is, objects or details related to the traumatic event can activate 
the trauma memory, and due to the low perceptual threshold, they are more easily noticed 
(Ehlers & Clark, 2000). 
Negative appraisals about the traumatic event and its effects are hypothesised to have 
an important role in the development and maintenance of PTSD. In PTSD, appraisals of the 
self may highlight meaningful and permanent self changes following the traumatic event. They 
may also disconfirm, or appear inconsistent with, positive self appraisals that existed before 
the trauma. Vulnerability to negative self-appraisals (e.g., “I am weak”) is particularly 
associated with the cognitive state of mental defeat, which refers to a perceived inability to 
influence one’s future. Negative self-appraisals (e.g., “I am vulnerable”) are also related to 
previous experiences of trauma or helplessness (Dunmore, Clark, & Ehlers, 1997, 1998, 1999). 
The impact of the trauma memory on the type of appraisals results with selective retrieval of 
congruent memories and information. PTSD appraisals are often themed with danger, violation 
of standards and loss. Therefore, they may create a sense of ongoing threat and PTSD 
symptoms. Posttraumatic symptoms are perpetuated by self-relevant appraisals about the 
trauma and its sequelae. Cognitive and behavioural responses, such as safety behaviours, 
initially aim to reduce the threat, but they stand in the way of cognitive change and maintain 
the problem.  
Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) model is well supported empirically. There is evidence that 
PTSD severity relates to mental defeat (e.g., Dunmore, Clark, & Ehlers, 2001) and to 
alienation and perceived permanent and negative change to one’s character (e.g., Ehlers, 
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Maercker, & Boos, 2000). Further empirical evidence relates PTSD with peri-traumatic 
processing (i.e., cognitive processing during the event), safety behaviours and avoidance (for a 
review, see Conway & Holmes, 2003). Negative self-appraisals have been related to PTSD 
diagnosis and symptom severity, and reductions of these appraisals following treatment was 
associated with fewer symptoms (Karl, Rabe, Zollner, Maercker, & Stopa, 2009).   
  In sum, Ehlers and Clark’s model describes four cognitive domains in the development 
and maintenance of PTSD. First, the trauma memory is shaped in part by peri-traumatic 
processing of the nature of the traumatic event (e.g., sudden versus predictable), previous 
trauma exposure and reactions, prior beliefs (e.g., about personal safety) and one’s state during 
the event (e.g., high arousal, which may impact cortisol levels and impede the encoding of the 
event). Second, the model describes negative appraisals of the event and its sequelae. Third, 
the trauma memory is associated with a sense of current threat and with PTSD symptoms. 
Fourth, maladaptive cognitive and behavioural strategies that maintain the symptoms are 
outlined. The model emphasizes the role of appraisals, and regards early experiences and 
beliefs in themselves as insufficient to the development of PTSD.   
1.3.5 The mnemonic model.  
The mnemonic model (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006a) challenges the idea that traumatic 
memories are qualitatively different to other autobiographical memories, proposed by Brewin 
et al. (1996). Rather, the mnemonic model claims that “there is no partial or complete, 
indelible memory of the initial encoding that can be recovered….. just normal memory 
functioning in extreme situations” (Rubin, Berntsen, & Klindt Johansen, 2008, p. 986).  
In the mnemonic model, trauma memories are seen as explicit (i.e., conscious, 
voluntary or involuntary) and influenced by goals, beliefs, attitudes, and individual and 
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personality factors, such as gender and neuroticism. The more available and self-defining the 
memory, the more likely it is to result in PTSD. As trauma memories are hypothesised to be 
similar to other autobiographical memories, theoretical models and research findings on 
general autobiographical memory are seen as relevant to PTSD (Rubin et al., 2008). The 
model is supported by the findings that schema violations do not necessarily cause fragmented 
memories (Schank, 1982; 1999). Memories of extremely emotional experiences are encoded 
and consolidated to a greater extent than less emotionally arousing events, because of the 
personal relevance, uniqueness, emotional intensity of the experience and the release of stress 
hormones during encoding (Cahill & McGaugh, 1998). Research shows that such 
distinctiveness makes memories more enhanced, well-remembered (Hunt & McDaniel, 1993; 
McGaugh, 2003) and accessible (Brewer & Treyens, 1981; Brown & Kulik, 1977; Rubin & 
Kozin, 1984).  
The mnemonic model describes turning points as key life events that shape self-
definition and structure, and maintain the self-concept (e.g., getting married, having children). 
Important memories often serve as turning points that organize narratives and life stories, or as 
reference points that anchor less significant events and memories in the self-system (Conway 
& Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Pillemer, 1998). Highly accessible trauma memories can act as 
reference or turning points, and subsequently, to carry a crucial role in structuring life stories 
and new knowledge. Attempts to merge trauma-related turning points within a consistent life 
story may alter the self concept, with the trauma becoming heavily anchored in identity. That 
is, the trauma memory becomes vividly remembered and frequently present in the process of 
referring to other memories and generating expectations for the future.   
  
16 
 
The model differs from others concerning the hypothesised role of self-consistency. As 
discussed, the SMS suggests that the requirement for coherence between the autobiographical 
memory and the trauma may cause schema or self change. In the mnemonic model, the mere 
centrality and accessibility of the trauma memory, together with self-consistency needs, lead to 
self schema change. The mnemonic model acknowledges individual differences in the 
development of trauma-centred identity, but variations in self-consistency needs have not yet 
been conceptualised.  
1.3.6 The Threat to the Conceptual Self (TCS). 
 The TCS (Jobson, 2009) is unique to other cognitive theories of PTSD in its 
consideration of culture, and cross-cultural differences, in the development and maintenance of 
PTSD. The TCS joins the three core structures of the SMS (the autobiographical knowledge 
base, the working self and the conceptual self) with the mnemonic model’s assumption that in 
PTSD, the trauma memory becomes a turning and reference point to other self-knowledge. 
These frameworks are further enlightened using cross-cultural research (e.g., Suh, 2002), to 
provide a culturally-sensitive account of PTSD (Jobson, 2009). Given this model’s cultural 
emphasis, it is described at greater length in section 1.5.7 on culture and self-consistency.  
1.3.7 Summary of PTSD models.  
A number of sophisticated PTSD models share the notion that one’s identity, or self, 
can be altered following trauma. Several theories support Brewin et al.’s (1996) view of the 
trauma memory in PTSD as distinct to other memories. Of those, Brewin (2011) associates 
PTSD with identity fragmentation, the SPAARS (Dalgleish, 2004) proposes a discrepancy 
between the trauma memory and pre-trauma schemas, the SMS (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
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2000) associates the trauma memory with the goals of the working self, which, owing to self-
consistency needs, can lead to trauma-related changes to the self concept, and Ehlers and 
Clark’s model (2000) describes appraisals of the self as permanently changed. The TCS 
(Jobson, 2009) hypothesises a unique orientation to the trauma memory (i.e., autonomous 
orientation), leading to (culturally varied) posttraumatic changes to identity. Lastly, the 
mnemonic model (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006a), whilst depicting the trauma memory as central 
and available (i.e., rather than poorly integrated as preceding models have), postulates that the 
constant remembering of the trauma may position the traumatic experience as a central 
component of identity (e.g., a turning/ reference point for other autobiographical material).  
Therefore it appears that, regardless of the nature of the trauma memory, a common 
idea in many cognitive PTSD models concerns the integration of the trauma with identity.  
Yet, other than the TCS (Jobson, 2009), a limitation of these models is that the pathway 
connecting identity changes and PTSD appears overly simplified. That is, these theoretical 
conceptualisations of PTSD lack clarity: how, and in whom, do changes in self/identity 
develop, and ultimately result in PTSD? To overcome this weakness in the theoretical field, 
and examine posttraumatic identity changes further, the scientific evidence linking PTSD and 
identity is critically analyzed and integrated in the section to come.  
1.4 Empirical Evidence for the Relationship between Trauma-Centred Identity and 
PTSD 
To review the empirical evidence on PTSD and identity, a literature search was 
conducted in November 2011. An initial computerized search of PsychINFO, PubMed, 
MetaLib, and Google Scholar databases included the terms *PTSD*, * trauma*, and 
*identity*. To ensure all relevant literature was obtained, the terms *traumatic*, *self*, 
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*Centrality of Events Scale* (CES; a measure of the centrality of traumatic memories to one’s 
identity) and *CES* were also searched. PubMed was searched for names of key researchers 
in the area: Dorthe Berntsen, David Rubin, Chris Brewin, Kylie Sutherland, Richard Bryant, 
and Laura Jobson. In all searches the language was restricted to English and no year 
limitations were applied.  
The search was extended by hand searching key journals (Applied Cognitive 
Psychology, Behaviour Research and Therapy, Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, Journal of Memory and Language, Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, Journal of Traumatic Stress, Memory and Cognition, and 
Personality Processes and Individual Differences) and books (1990 to present) using the terms 
listed above.  
1.4.1 Trauma-centred identity and PTSD.  
The inclusion criteria for this review were limited to quantitative studies that assessed 
posttraumatic symptoms and trauma-centred identity. Case reports, qualitative studies and 
studies not published in peer-reviewed journals were excluded.  
The terms search yielded 157 results and the author search 346. Of these, 21 studies 
met the inclusion criteria. For presentation purposes, they are grouped according to the 
measures they used to assess trauma identity. Table 1 details the reviewed studies in terms of 
sample, measures and the main findings. 
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Table 1 
Sample Characteristics, Measures and Main Findings of the 21 Reviewed Studies 
Study Sample Identity 
Measures 
Main Findings 
Studies that assessed trauma-centred identity indirectly 
Byrne, Hyman, and 
Scott (2001). 
Female 
American 
students 
(n=113). 
The Memory 
Characteristics 
Questionnaire 
(Jonson et al., 
1988; Hyman et 
al., 1998). 
PTSD symptoms were positively 
associated with the significance 
of the trauma memory for self 
understanding. 
McNally, Lasko, 
Macklin, and Pitman 
(1995). 
American 
Vietnam 
veterans with 
(n=19) and 
without (n=13) 
PTSD. 
An 
autobiographical 
memory test. 
Poorer retrieval of specific 
autobiographical memories in 
PTSD veterans, especially in 
regalia wearers; No latency 
differences in memory retrieval 
in regalia-wearers compared with 
faster retrieval for positive 
adjectives in non-regalia wearers 
(when PTSD severity and 
depression were controlled). 
Studies that used the Centrality of Events Scale (CES) 
Berntsen and Rubin 
(2004). 
Danish 
Psychology 
students 
(n=111). 
Five CES items. CES items correlated with PTSD 
symptoms and depression. 
Berntsen and Rubin 
(2006a). 
American 
students 
(n=707). 
7-item CES. CES items correlated with PTSD 
symptoms and with depression; 
Full and 7-item CES versions 
were highly reliable and 
correlated with each another. 
Berntsen and Rubin Danes Three questions Composite CES score was the 
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(2006b, two studies). (n=1,021, age  
18-58; n =423, 
age 59-90)  
from the CES. strongest predictor of 
posttraumatic stress levels in 
both samples. 
Berntsen and Rubin 
(2007, two studies). 
Danish 
(n=247) and 
American 
(n=442) 
students. 
20- and 7-item 
CES. 
CES scores positively correlated 
with and predicted PTSD, 
independently of event type and 
severity; CES scores positively 
correlated with depression, state 
and trait anxiety; Trait anxiety 
and depression were stronger 
predictors of PTSD than CES.  
Berntsen, Rubin, and 
Siegler (2011). 
American 
university 
alumni in their 
60s (n =2,526) 
7-item CES 
(completed 
twice, for a 
traumatic event 
and for a highly 
positive event). 
Trauma-centred identity 
correlated with PTSD severity, 
event severity, number of 
lifetime traumas, neuroticism and 
openness; CES scores for trauma 
events were predicted by PTSD 
symptoms and previous trauma 
severity; Recent traumas were 
more central to identity; 
Evidence for cultural influences 
on identity. 
Berntsen and 
Thomsen (2005). 
Danes (n =145, 
age 72-89).  
Three CES items CES scores correlated positively 
with intrusive memory 
frequency, dreams and perceived 
impact. 
Bentsen, Willert, and 
Rubin (2003). 
Danish 
students 
(n=181, 62% 
trauma 
survivors). 
Two CES items. PTSD diagnosis associated with 
CES items; Trauma-centred 
identity was related to intrusive 
memories (when treatment 
effects controlled). 
Boals (2010, two 
studies). 
American 
students 
(n=170, 58% 
female) and 
(n=111, 53% 
female). 
7-item CES  Females perceived negative 
events as more central to identity 
and were more influenced by 
negative events; Events with high 
CES scores correlated with 
emotional intensity and repetitive 
recall in the entire sample; CES 
scores predicted intrusive 
symptoms and frequency of 
health care visits. 
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Boelen (2009). American 
participants 
who had 
experienced 
bereavements 
(n =254). 
7-item CES.  The centrality of loss to identity 
was associated with PTSD 
symptoms, but not when 
neuroticism, attachment, 
background variables, 
complicated grief and depression 
were controlled. 
Brown, Antonius, 
Kramer, Root, and 
Hirst (2010). 
American 
veterans 
(n=46, 44% 
probable 
PTSD). 
7-item CES. PTSD associated with trauma-
centred identity in the entire 
sample when depression was 
controlled; Trauma centrality and 
depression independently 
predicted PTSD. 
Robinaugh and 
McNally (2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
American 
students and 
community 
participants 
(n=120). 
16 items of the 
20-item CES. 
PTSD symptoms positively 
correlated with CES scores for 
shame/ guilt events; Visual 
perspectives of the trauma 
memory were mediated by the 
centrality of shame-provoking 
events to identity, and moderated 
the relationship between 
emotional intensity and PTSD. 
Robinaugh and 
McNally (2011). 
Females 
(n=102) with 
child sexual 
abuse history. 
20-item CES. CES predicted PTSD symptoms 
(when five variables were 
controlled); CES was underlined 
by three factors, each correlated 
with PTSD; The ‘viewing the 
future through the lens of the 
trauma’ factor was most strongly 
correlated with PTSD. 
 
   
Rubin, Boals, and 
Berntsen (2008, three 
studies). 
American 
students (n 
ranged 81-533)  
20-item CES. CES correlated with PCL (when 
depression and dissociation were 
controlled); Involuntary 
memories were accompanied by 
emotional reaction and mood 
change, but were less central to 
the life story than voluntary 
memories.   
                            
Rubin, Dennis, and Western 20-item CES. CES scores correlated with 
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Beckham (2011). community 
sample 
(n=117, 64% 
with PTSD 
diagnosis).  
PTSD; PTSD was related to 
trauma-centred identity, 
emotional responses to trauma 
and voluntary and involuntary 
memories.  
Schuettler and Boals 
(2011). 
American 
students 
(n=2,326). 
20-item CES. CES was the second strongest 
predictor of PTSD. 
 
Studies that used self-defining memories (SDM) 
Jobson and 
O’Kearney (2006). 
Australian 
(n=26) and 
Asian (n =24) 
students. 
SDM. Trauma-themed ratios were not 
significantly different in the two 
groups; Trauma-themed SDM 
correlated with PTSD in 
Australians only. 
Jobson and 
O’Kearney (2008) 
Community 
sample from 
independent 
(PTSD n =26, 
no PTSD 
n=31) and 
interdependent 
(PTSD n =24, 
no PTSD 
n=25) cultures.  
SDM                
15 goals        
Twenty-
Statements Test  
PTSD group had more trauma-
themed SDM, goals and self-
cognitions than the no-PTSD 
group in independent cultures, 
but no group differences were 
found in interdependent cultures. 
Sutherland and Bryant 
(2006). 
Australian 
trauma-
exposed with 
(n =17)/ 
without (n=16) 
PTSD/ no-
trauma 
controls 
(n=16). 
SDM. PTSD associated with trauma-
related, negatively-themed SDM; 
Trauma-themed SDM correlated 
with personal goals about 
traumatic experiences. 
 Note. CES stands for the Centrality of Events Scale (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006a); PCL stands 
for the PTSD Check List (Weathers, Litz, Herman, Huska, & Keane, 1993); SDM stands for 
self-defining memories. 
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1.4.1.1 Studies that assessed identity indirectly. 
Two early studies documented the impact of PTSD on participants’ identity. McNally 
et al. (1995) asked Vietnam veterans to retrieve personal memories in response to positive and 
negative traits. Veterans with PTSD who attended the experiment wearing military regalia 
(e.g., war medals) retrieved significantly more war-related memories than veterans with PTSD 
who did not wear regalia. The researchers hypothesised that by wearing military regalia, 
veterans demonstrated the importance of their military service to their identity. Yet this 
inference is limited by the fact that participants without PTSD rarely wore regalia, and 
therefore, PTSD diagnosis may confound regalia wearing. Wearing regalia may indicate 
trauma-centred identity, but, it may predict autobiographical memory changes (i.e., the 
disproportionate retrieval of war-related memories) independently of PTSD status. 
Additionally, the statistical power was low because regalia effects were not predicted a priori.  
Byrne et al. (2001) administered a modified version of the Memory Characteristics 
Questionnaire (Hyman, Gilstrap, Decker, & Wilkinson, 1998; Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & 
Raye, 1988). This measure has an item that enquires about the importance of a remembered 
event for self-definition. The data from the 77 participants who provided traumatic memories 
showed a significant positive correlation between the notion that the trauma memory was 
important for self understanding and PTSD symptoms as measured by the PTSD checklist 
(PCL; Weathers et al., 1993). While providing preliminary support for the association between 
PTSD and identity, this finding was derived from a single item and a university sample.  
1.4.1.2 Studies using the Centrality of Events Scale (CES).   
The Centrality of Events Scale (CES; Berntsen & Rubin, 2006a), discussed at length in 
section 2.3.4, measures the extent to which a stressful or traumatic memory is central to one’s 
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life story and identity. The 20-item scale or 7-item version were used in 17 of the studies. In 
some cases, a smaller number of items were used, which hindered the accuracy of measure, but 
adequate reliabilities were described in all the studies. These studies are grouped by sample 
type. 
Fourteen studies sampled Western student populations. In the first 10, PTSD was 
evaluated using the PCL. In the study by Berntsen et al. (2003), respondents whose symptom 
profiles met the diagnostic criteria for PTSD scored significantly higher on CES questions, 
intrusive memories and avoidance coping compared with respondents without PTSD. Several 
respondents had previously received treatment for their trauma. When the effects of treatment 
were statistically controlled, the item ‘‘I feel the traumatic event has become part of my 
identity’’ was significantly positively associated with the frequency of intrusive memories and 
with the degree to which the trauma had violated participants’ expectations. The study 
provided  support for the validity of the trauma-centred identity construct, as it was 
investigated in relation to empirically expected variables (specific types of PTSD symptoms) 
and theoretically expected variables (violation of participant’s expectations). The ecological 
validity and generalisability of the results are enhanced in light of the sample range, size, and 
the heterogeneity of trauma type. 
Several studies (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004; Berntsen & Rubin 2006a; Berntsen & Rubin, 
2007; Schuettler & Boals, 2011; Smeets et al., 2010) found CES items were positively 
correlated with PTSD symptoms and were strong predictors of PTSD symptoms. CES scores 
have also been found to positively correlate with depression, state and trait anxiety. 
Furthermore, respondents whose traumatic events met the DSM-IV stressor criterion 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994) had higher CES and PCL scores, compared with 
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participants whose traumas did not meet diagnostic criteria (Berntsen & Rubin, 2007). These 
studies found the CES and 7-item CES version to be reliable and valid. 
Rubin et al. (2008) examined voluntary and involuntary memories for traumatic events. 
CES and PCL were positively associated when depression and dissociation were included as 
covariates. Involuntary memories were accompanied by more emotional reaction and mood 
change but were less central to the life story, compared with voluntary memories. The degree 
of emotional intensity of both memory types accounted for PTSD symptom variance when 
depression, dissociation and trauma-centred identity were entered into a regression model, 
suggesting that PTSD severity is increased in those who experience memories with higher 
emotional intensity and life story relevance. The strengths of the study include the 
measurement of important, non-traumatic events and the comparison of voluntary and 
involuntary memories. Emotion intensity, which mediated trauma-centred identity and PTSD, 
was also comprehensively assessed.   
In Boals’ (2010) studies, female participants were significantly more likely than males 
to perceive negative events as central to identity. Females were more negatively influenced by 
negative events (as indexed by higher ratings for negative emotions, emotional intensity and 
associated PTSD symptoms). Across the entire sample, memories of positive and negative 
events that had high CES scores correlated with emotional intensity and high intrusiveness (as 
indexed by repetitive recall), suggesting that emotional intensity and intrusiveness keep 
memories highly accessible and influential over new experiences and self perceptions. Trauma 
centrality was also found to predict a measure of physical health (as indexed by frequency of 
health care visits). Boals’ work extends previous studies with regards to gender differences in 
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trauma-centred identity. It is criticized for conducting multiple simultaneous t-tests, as this 
potentially increases Type I error.  
 In a web-based survey, Robinaugh and McNally (2010) found that PTSD symptoms 
were positively correlated with CES scores for events associated with shame or guilt. Visual 
perspectives (i.e., experiencing the memory in first/ third person perspective) were mediated 
by the centrality of shame-provoking events to identity. One limitation is the restricted range 
of distressing events experienced by the predominantly student sample.   
In the studies reviewed thus far, a repeated shortcoming was the use of Western, 
student samples. Such samples limit the generalisability of findings to populations of other age 
groups and cultures. The next series of studies administered the CES to community, older adult 
and veteran samples. 
Three studies sampled participants from the general community. Berntsen and Rubin 
(2006b) found that trauma-centred identity, as measured with the composite CES score, was 
the largest predictor of posttraumatic stress levels for traumatic events experienced after young 
adulthood, when time since the events and age at time of the events were included as 
covariates. The variance in time since trauma and age at time of the event increase the external 
validity of these findings. In a study by Rubin et al. (2011), participants with PTSD had more 
emotional responses to trauma memories, and considered them as more central to their identity 
compared with controls. This evidence suggests that the tendency in PTSD to perceive the 
traumatic event as central to identity extends to non-student samples. The diversity of the 
sample in terms of gender, age and civilian-veteran participants, and the inclusion of subjects 
with dual-diagnoses, extend the generalisability of the findings. Robinaugh and McNally 
(2011) found that trauma-centred identity correlated with PTSD symptoms and predicted 
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PTSD symptoms in female participants with a history of sexual abuse in childhood, when age, 
intelligence, depression, self-esteem and dissociation were statistically controlled. 
Additionally, a principal component analysis of the CES identified three factors. Of these, the 
extent to which survivors view the future through the lens of the trauma was more strongly 
associated with PTSD than the other two factors, namely centrality to identity and the trauma 
as a turning point. These results suggest that the centrality of the trauma to the future is most 
detrimental.  
Three studies focused on participants over the age of 60. In Berntsen and Thomsen’s 
(2005) study, composite CES scores correlated positively with intrusive memory frequency, 
dreams about the German occupation period, and with participants’ notion that the occupation 
“left a scar on their soul”. Trauma-centred identity was related to well-being over the longer-
term period. In the study by Berntsen et al. (2011), regression analyses indicated an increased 
tendency to perceive traumatic events as central to identity when they occurred in the recent 
past compared to earlier in life, with the exception of traumatic experiences in early childhood. 
The centrality of traumatic events to identity was found to be positively correlated with PTSD 
symptom severity, event severity, number of traumas during life, neuroticism and openness. 
The centrality of positive events, but not of traumas, corresponded with cultural national life 
events, suggesting cultural influences on the structuring of life story and identity. These 
studies extend the assessment of trauma-centred identity to older populations, although the 
latter study is criticized for differences in measure administration times and cohort effects. 
Boelen’s (2009) finding that the centrality of loss to identity was positively associated with 
PTSD symptoms became non-significant when personality characteristics (neuroticism, 
attachment and attachment avoidance), background variables, complicated grief and 
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depression were statistically controlled. The centrality of the loss in the bereaved participants 
correlated with emotional problems following the loss. However, constructs hypothesised to be 
associated with bereavement-related distress, such as rumination, were not assessed. 
Brown et al. (2010) examined combat-related trauma centrality in veterans. PTSD 
symptom severity was positively associated with trauma-centred identity in veterans with and 
without PTSD, when depression was controlled. Trauma centrality and depression were 
independent predictors of PTSD symptom severity in the entire sample. The study limitations 
include the use of only few measures, and the predominantly male sample. 
1.4.1.3 Studies using self-defining memories. 
Trauma-centrality has additionally been assessed using Singer and Salovey’s (1993) 
self-defining memories task (SDM), discussed at length in section 2.3.4. In this research 
paradigm, participants initially read a short definition of self-defining memories as clearly 
remembered, important memories that are associated with strong, positive or negative feelings, 
and “convey powerfully how you have come to be the person you are” (Jobson & O’Kearney, 
2008, p.99). The trauma-centrality index score is the ratio of trauma- themed to non-trauma- 
themed SDM. In Sutherland and Bryant’s (2006) study, participants with PTSD provided 
significantly more negative, trauma- themed SDM. Trauma- themed SDM also correlated with 
personal goals that concerned traumatic experiences. By using a different measure to the CES, 
Sutherland and Bryant’s (2006) findings extend the evidence base on the relationship between 
trauma-centered identity and PTSD. They also provide support for the SMS model (Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), in which traumatic information is seen as a threat to self-related goals 
and the need for self-consistency. The study strengths are the inclusion of a control group, 
which reduced the likelihood that findings resulted from a predisposition to recall negative 
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events, and controlling the type of traumatic event in the statistical analysis, which ensured 
that trauma type did not influence the observed associations. The limitations include the 
potential order effects, as SDM were elicited before goals, and the small, Western and 
predominantly female sample as it limits the generalisability of findings.  
Jobson and O’Kearney (2006; 2008) conducted two studies. The first study recruited 
Australian and Asian university students. The two groups were not significantly different in 
trauma-themed identity ratios. A strong association was found between posttraumatic 
symptoms and the degree to which SDM were trauma-themed in the Australian group, but not 
in the Asian group, suggesting cultural differences in trauma-centred identity. A limitation of 
the study was that only SDM were used as a measure of identity. Another limitation is the 
small sample size of which few met criteria for PTSD, as it reduced confidence in statistical 
outcomes and ecological validity. Jobson and O’Kearney (2008) asked trauma survivors from 
individualistic and collectivistic cultures with and without PTSD to complete three identity 
measures: SDM, 15 goals and self-cognitions. Self cognitions were measured using the 
Twenty Statements Test (TST; Kuhn & McPartland, 1954). The TST, discussed at length in 
section 2.3.3, asks participants for 20 statements in response to the question ‘who am I?’. In 
agreement with previous findings in Western, individualistic cultures, those with PTSD 
produced more SDM, goals and self-cognitions that were trauma-themed than those without 
PTSD. In contrast, in non-Western, collectivistic cultures participants with and without PTSD 
were similar in terms of their trauma-themed SDM, goals and self cognitions. These outcomes 
challenge previous findings reported in individualistic cultures as well as theoretical models 
that associate trauma-centred identity with PTSD (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006a; 2007; Conway, 
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2005). Jobson and O’Kearney’s findings suggest cultural variability in the relationship 
between trauma-centred identity and PTSD.  
1.4.2 Summary. 
There is strong evidence linking PTSD symptoms with trauma-themed changes to 
identity. This association is independent of trauma type and severity. CES scores and 
posttraumatic symptoms have been found to predict each another in various Western 
populations and across the age span. This evidence supports theoretical models that highlight 
changes to the self in PTSD. As discussed, the SMS model (Conway, 2005; Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) postulates that when the traumatic event is inconsistent with one’s self-
concept, the self-system may alter the trauma memory and the self-concept with the wish of 
achieving consistency. Changes to the self-concept may include adopting a victim identity or 
highlighting how the self has changed following the trauma (Conway, 2005). According to the 
mnemonic model (Berntsen and Rubin, 2006a), the recurrent and easily-emerging nature of 
trauma memories lead survivors to perceive the trauma as a significant life turning point. 
Attempts to incorporate the trauma memories into a coherent life narrative might heavily 
anchor the trauma in survivors’ identity. However the SMS and mnemonic models and the 
evidence in their favour are based on participants and views from Western, individualistic 
cultures. The reviewed studies that assessed trauma-centred identity using SDM in non-
Western, collectivistic cultures suggest cultural differences in the relationship between trauma-
centred identity and PTSD (Jobson & O’Kearney, 2006; 2008). The influence of traumatic 
experiences on identity, as it appears, may be less pronounced in people from non-
individualistic cultures. These findings call into question the cross-cultural suitability of PTSD 
theories that link posttraumatic symptoms with trauma-themed changes to identity.  
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1.5 Self and Identity 
 As discussed above, posttraumatic shifts to the self or identity are perhaps culturally-
dependent. The following section explores the self further, focusing on a particular facet of the 
self: self-consistency, and its putative role in psychological wellbeing and PTSD.  
1.5.1 Definition of the self. 
The study of the “self” in modern psychology began with William James’ definitions 
of the self in his 1890 text Principles of Psychology (Conway, 2005). More recently, the self 
has been conceptualised as a dynamic force that interprets and organizes information about 
oneself, responds to the social environment and motivates behaviour (e.g., Markus & Wurf, 
1987). Cognitive approaches share a multifaceted view of the self as a system of self-schemas. 
Self-schemas capture experiences and affect the processing of self-relevant information 
(Markus, 1977). They are situationally-triggered and easily elicited, especially when they have 
recently been activated. The accessible schemas heighten awareness to relevant information 
and its encoding, and guide subsequent behaviour (Leary & Tangney, 2003). Schemas vary in 
content (e.g., information about one’s qualities, roles and goals), structure (e.g., their 
integration, organization and clarity; Campbell, 1990; Campbell & Lavallee, 1993; Donahue et 
al., 1993; Linville, 1985; 1987) and coherence (i.e., the degree to which one perceives oneself 
as being consistent; Markus, 1977). 
1.5.2 Definition of self-consistency. 
Self-consistency is often understood as a state of internal and cross-situational 
consistency. Internal consistency refers to a congruent view of oneself, free from conflict or 
ambivalence (Boucher, 2011). Cross-situational consistency, also named interpersonal 
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consistency, refers to congruency across roles, relationships and contexts (Cross, Gore, & 
Morris, 2003). Interpersonal consistency is described by Block (1961) as a dimension bound 
by two extremes: “At one end of this dimension, there is ‘role diffusion’, where an individual 
is an interpersonal chameleon, with no inner core of identity, fitfully reacting in all ways to all 
people......At the other extreme, there is what might be called ‘role rigidity’, where an 
individual behaves uniformly in all situations, disregarding the different responsibilities 
different circumstances may impose” (p.392). Recently, Brewin (2003) described identity as a 
collection of multiple selves that manifest in different occasions and contexts. 
1.5.3 Theories of self-consistency. 
1.5.3.1 Dissonance theory. 
In social psychology, Festinger (1957) defined ‘cognitive dissonance’ as the experience 
of having inconsistent cognitions that relate in some way. Cognitive dissonance produces 
aversive feelings, unpleasant physiological arousal and ‘dissonance motivation’ to release the 
unease. The dissonance may be solved by reducing the salience of one of the dissonant 
cognitions to enable a smooth assimilation, by modifying one of the cognitions so that it can 
be replaced by the other, or by gaining social support (Festinger, 1957; Festinger, Riecken, & 
Schachter, 1956). Inconsistent cognitions may lead to aversive emotional states such as anger, 
anxiety, or shame, and they may impact subsequent action (Harmon-Jones, 1999).  
1.5.3.2 Self-consistency theories. 
Another theory in social psychology, Kelley’s (1967), hypothesised that consistency 
mediates attribution processes. High levels of self-consistency (e.g., involvement in a 
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typical/familiar behaviour) are associated with dispositional attributions. Low levels of self-
consistency (e.g., displaying unusual behaviour) are associated with situational attributions. 
Allport (1937) assumed that personality traits are stable and consistent; being able to recognize 
others’ traits may assist individuals to predict their behaviour. Consistency in how one portrays 
and conducts oneself was hypothesised to provide a reassuring sense of personal continuity 
and integrity (Block, 1961; Lecky, 1945). Consistency is also thought to promote self-
verification, defined as the need to ensure that others’ perceptions are consistent with our own 
self views (reviewed in Swann, Rentfrom, & Guinn, 2003). Self-verification helps individuals 
to validate and maintain their existing self-concept, for instance, by selectively attending to 
those who regard them similarly to their own perceptions (Swann & Read, 1981). Thus, self-
consistency serves epistemic (e.g., need to avoid ambiguity) and pragmatic (e.g., mutual 
predictability) needs, and facilitates more comfortable interpersonal interactions. 
Whether new information is consistent with one’s existing self-concept will affect the 
individual’s response. Research on self-referential processing had shown that reaction time is 
quicker with relation to information consistent with one’s existing self-judgement (Tschanz & 
Rhodewalt, 2001). In cognitive-affective terms, change to the self-concept is taxing and 
inefficient (Conway, 2005). 
1.5.4 Self-consistency and psychological adjustment.  
Consistency is regarded by many as important for well-being and self-actualization. 
James (1929) viewed individuals with conflicting temperaments and inconsistent qualities as 
“sick souls” leading chaotic lives. Lecky (1945) defined self integrity as “seeking those 
experiences which support our values, and avoiding, resisting, or if necessary forcibly 
rejecting those which are inconsistent with them” (p.99). Humanistic psychologists Maslow 
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(1954), Rogers (1951) and Jourard (1965) also perceived inconsistencies in the self-concept or 
between behaviours and the self-concept as unhealthy and provoking anxiety and defences. 
Maslow (1954) claimed specifically that to achieve self-actualization, inner conflicts must be 
“merged and coalesced to form unities” (p. 233). Self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987) 
brings these ideas together, stating that actual self-views which are incongruent with one’s 
ought and ideal selves may result in anxiety and depression. There is empirical evidence 
supporting the idea that identity consistency is a fundamental psychological predictor of well-
being (e.g., Donahue et al., 1993; Roberts & Donahue, 1994). There is also evidence that 
discrepancies across roles and situations are associated with reduced self-esteem and higher 
depression, anxiety and somatisation symptoms (Block, 1961; Donahue et al., 1993; Sheldon, 
Ryan, Rawsthorne, & Ilardi, 1997).  
Others have claimed that high levels of self-consistency may become maladaptive. One 
theory in social psychology argues that consistency limits the capacity to react to different 
situations in a flexible and adaptive manner (Gergen, 1971; Sande, Goethals, & Radloff, 
1988). With regards to traits that are perceived as negative or undesirable, high levels of self-
consistency may cultivate a “spillover effect” of negative experiences from one situation to 
others (Linville, 1985; 1987). The latter view received support in Locke’s (2006) findings; 
consistency of desirable traits predicted well-being, whereas consistency of undesirable traits 
and well-being were inversely associated. 
1.5.5 Self-consistency and PTSD.  
Horowitz (1976) proposed that trauma information that is incongruent with previously 
held beliefs may lead to posttraumatic symptoms. Similarly, Berntsen and Rubin (2006a), and 
Conway (2005) hypothesised that the need for consistency mediates psychological adjustment 
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in the aftermath of trauma. Cultural sanctions or expectations encourage individuals to identify 
with culturally- expected social roles. Individuals whose trauma memories have become 
turning points are hypothesised to adopt the social role of trauma victims/ survivors, and this 
may result with trauma-centred identities (Berntsen & Rubin, 2007). Conway’s contention 
about the need for agreement between trauma-specific goals and present goals also predicted a 
form of goal change to maintain coherence. When present goals shift to accommodate trauma-
related goals, the trauma can become increasingly central to identity (Conway, Meares, & 
Standart, 2004). However, the cross-cultural research reviewed above had identified cultural 
differences in the relationship between PTSD and trauma-centred identity (Jobson & 
O’Kearney, 2006; 2008). Therefore, it is possible that the theoretical assumptions on self-
consistency and PTSD may be limited to individualistic cultures. In order to consider cultural 
differences in self-consistency and their relation to PTSD, the influence of culture on self-
consistency will now be discussed.  
1.5.6 Culture and self-consistency 
Cultural individualism and collectivism describe the extent to which one’s self is 
defined in relation to others (Triandis, 1995). From a cultural psychology position, 
individualism and collectivism are regarded by some as separate dimensions (Schwartz, 1990; 
Triandis, 1995; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) and by others as a single dimension: ‘the 
comparison between whether one’s identity is defined by personal choices and achievements, 
or by the character of the collective groups to which one is more or less permanently attached’ 
(Smith & Bond, 1993, p.38).  
Individualism, typically associated with Western cultures, is where self-definition is 
derived from internal traits and there is an emphasis on an autonomous self (Choi, Nisbett, & 
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Norenzayan, 1999). Individualists typically seek autonomy, achievement and appreciation 
(Hui & Villareal, 1989). Britain has been recognized as an individualistic culture (Hofstede & 
Hofstede, 2004) and is seen to have become increasingly more individualistic since the 1980s 
(reviewed in Tower, Kelly, & Richards, 1997). Collectivism, also referred to as cultural 
interdependence, is commonly associated with non-Western cultures, and is where people are 
perceived to be embedded within a larger social structure, their identity defined through 
relationships with others in different social contexts (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; 2010). 
Collectivists typically aim to gain affiliation, social support and care (Hui & Villareal, 1989). 
Russia has been identified as a collectivistic culture (Triandis, 1995). The communist rule of 
the former Soviet Union promoted collectivistic thinking and behaviour, as state goals came 
before individual ones (Kerberly, 1983; Triandis, 1995). Reliance on others was mandatory for 
survival, and events and individual actions were viewed as having situational causes (Varnum, 
Grossman, Katunar, Nisbett, & Kitayama, 2008). Studies have shown that Russians regard 
friendships very highly (Rokeach, 1973), and place friends before family life and self-
fulfilment (Karpukhin & Kutsenko, 1983). These findings correspond with the definition of 
collectivism as being part of a group that provides support in exchange for loyalty, whereas 
individualistic values are seen to promote caring for oneself and one’s close family (Hofstede 
& Bond, 1984). During the transition away from communism and to the present day, Russians 
continue to be more collectivistic than Americans (reviewed in Hofstede, 2001). Compared 
with British participants, Russians were found to present more collectivistic opinions and to 
stress the importance of preserving in-group harmony when striving for collective aims (Tower 
et al., 1997). Additional evidence suggests that the collectivistic tendencies in Russians and 
other former-USSR nationalities are intentional rather than inevitable (Smith, Dugan, & 
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Trompennars, 1996). In all cultures, the degree to which people demonstrate individualistic or 
collectivistic orientations varies (e.g., Lee & Zane, 1998). However, significant differences 
between individualistic and collectivistic cultures have been documented (e.g., Fiske, 
Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998; Kagitcibasi, 1996).   
Suh (2000) described cultural differences in self-consistency needs. According to Suh, 
the need to establish an internally and cross-situationally consistent self is fundamental for 
well-being in Western, independent cultures, whereas collectivistic cultures perceive increased 
self-consistency as indicating arrogance or immaturity. Boucher’s (2011) review suggests that 
members of collectivistic cultures are more prone to choose contradictory personality traits as 
self-descriptive and to choose items that correspond with both positive and negative self-
esteem, compared with members of individualistic cultures. Collectivists provide more varied 
self roles and are less disturbed by inconsistent self descriptions across different contexts, 
compared with individualists (reviewed in Boucher, 2011).  
Suh (2002) compared self-consistency needs in 84 American and 123 Korean students. 
Participants were asked to rate the extent to which 20 personality traits described them 
generally and across five interpersonal contexts. Americans were found to have a significantly 
more consistent self-view than Koreans. The American sample displayed significantly higher 
correlations between their general self and social roles ratings. The Korean participants 
displayed more flexibility across the different roles. Self-consistency, while related to 
subjective well-being in both samples, was a stronger predictor of subjective well-being for 
Americans than for Koreans. The evidence from Suh’s work supports the idea that members of 
individualistic cultures have higher levels of self-consistency, whereas in collectivistic cultures 
self views are more flexible and less consistent. The strengths of Suh’s work included 
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sampling individuals in their cultural environment, (i.e., in their home countries), deriving self-
consistency results through statistical calculations which introduced less intrusion of cultural 
norms to participants’ responses, and piloting the study to construe the self-consistency 
measure. A limitation was the use of young, student samples. 
Webb and Jobson (2011) were the first to explore the relationships between levels of 
self-consistency, trauma-centred identity and posttraumatic symptoms. In 134 British students, 
the study replicated (e.g., Jobson & O’Kearney, 2008) the previously described positive 
correlation between trauma-centred identity and posttraumatic symptoms. A positive 
association between self-consistency and intrusive posttraumatic symptoms emerged when 
depressive symptoms were controlled. This is of interest as previous studies have found that 
states of aversive affect, such as depression, anxiety, stress and low-self esteem, were 
negatively associated with self-consistency (e.g., Donahue et al., 1993). Therefore, Webb and 
Jobson’s work proposed a unique relationship between self-consistency and PTSD compared 
to other psychological disorders. Yet this finding should be interpreted with caution, given 
Miller and Chapman’s (2001) contention that the effects of depression must not be removed 
from PTSD as the two are too closely associated. Webb and Jobson (2011) also reported that 
self-consistency was not correlated with trauma-centred identity, and that depression and 
trauma-centred identity, but not self-consistency, significantly predicted intrusive 
posttraumatic symptoms. A weakness of this work was the unusually low level of 
posttraumatic symptoms reported, compared with community samples. Further limitations 
concern the use of just one identity measure and the absence of a trauma history assessment. In 
addition, these finding may be limited to Western, individualistic cultures. 
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1.5.7 The Threat to the Conceptual Self (TCS). 
The TCS (Jobson, 2009) is a theoretical model that builds on the SMS. It incorporates 
empirical findings about cultural variations in the self construct and their implications for the 
development and maintenance of PTSD. In TCS, individuals are hypothesised to have 
relatedness and autonomous goal hierarchies, as well as separate independent and 
interdependent sections of the autobiographical knowledge base. Cultural and social 
expectations lead to and continuously reinforce the dominance of one of the orientations. 
Culturally-appropriate activations of autonomous or relatedness goals enable the integration of 
memories into the independent or interdependent location of the autobiographical knowledge 
base. The culturally-dominant orientation can be overruled by certain events, such as trauma. 
Information that differs from the dominant or schema-driven expectation, especially 
concerning unusual or emotional events, is highly accessible and well remembered (e.g., Rubin 
& Kozin, 1984; Berntsen & Rubin, 2007). Given that information in the trauma memory often 
differs from schema-driven expectations, the trauma is likely to be well remembered and to 
serve as a “reference point” (Berntsen & Rubin, 2007).  
In the TCS, self-consistency needs are hypothesised to mediate the impact of the 
trauma memory on identity. Highly accessible autobiographical memories can define and 
anchor identity and the self-concept (e.g., Berntsen & Rubin, 2007). TCS proposes that the 
perception of the trauma as a central life turning point combined with a need for internal 
consistency, may cause trauma-related self perceptions (e.g., self as victim) to become central 
to one’s identity. That is, the centrality of the trauma memory in individuals’ identity is 
governed by self-consistency needs, which are culturally variable. Therefore, in survivors from 
individualistic cultures, where high levels of self-consistency are valued, it is hypothesised that 
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central trauma memories may lead to trauma-centred identity. In collectivistic cultures where 
self-consistency is less desirable, central trauma memories are less likely to influence 
survivors’ identity (Jobson, 2009).  
1.5.8 Summary: Cultural differences in self-consistency and identity. 
The finding that low levels of self-consistency were associated with negative affective 
states in individualistic but not in collectivistic cultures (Suh, 2002) questions whether the 
theorized benefits of self-consistency (e.g., Festinger, 1957) apply to cultures who value a 
multiple and changing self. There is also evidence for cultural variability in posttraumatic 
changes to identity. For instance, in individualistic cultures identity was more trauma-centred 
in trauma survivors with PTSD than trauma survivors without PTSD, but in collectivistic 
cultures trauma survivors with and without PTSD had similar levels of trauma-centeredness 
(Jobson & O’Kearney, 2008). Yet the relationships between self-consistency, PTSD and 
posttraumatic changes to identity remain unclear, partially due to the paucity of studies that 
evaluated participants from non-individualistic cultures.  
1.6 Implications for treatment  
This final section discusses psychological therapies for PTSD relating to the theoretical 
models discussed before, and reviews the current evidence for the effectiveness of 
psychological and pharmacological treatments for PTSD.  
1.6.1 Treatment based on PTSD models. 
It is common for trauma survivors to experience symptoms in the days and even weeks 
after the event, and for these symptoms to resolve without treatment. Instinctively, the majority 
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of survivors process the meaning of the trauma, both cognitively and emotionally, and store 
the trauma memory alongside other past memories. Yet the prevalence rates of PTSD point to 
the cases in which recovery is interrupted.  
According to Conway (2005) and Ehlers and Clark (2000), recovery from trauma 
requires the different aspects of the trauma memories to be well connected with one another 
and with pre-trauma autobiographical knowledge and memories. Poor posttraumatic coping 
may be improved through the elaboration of the trauma memory, to enable its integration with 
other aspects of the self. Hence, changes in self-consistency (i.e., enhanced coherence of the 
trauma within the self structure) are assumed, although not directly targeted in treatment. 
Rather, trauma-focused therapies are to concentrate explicitly on the memories and cognitive 
appraisals associated with the trauma (Resnick, 2001b). The evidence-based NICE guidelines 
for PTSD (National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, 2005) recommend Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy (CBT) and Eye Movement Desensitisation and Reprocessing (EMDR), 
both of which centre upon the trauma memory and appraisals. Pharmacological interventions 
for PTSD have been recommended as well (Davidson, 1997). 
1.6.2 Exposure therapy, cognitive therapy and other psychological therapies for 
PTSD. 
Cognitive behavioural therapies for PTSD combine exposure, to facilitate habituation 
to trauma reminders, and cognitive restructuring, to challenge and accommodate trauma-
related appraisals and schemas. Exposure may take different forms in the treatment of PTSD. 
Systematic desensitisation (Wolpe, 1958) involves the acquisition of relaxation skills, followed 
by gradual, mental exposure to fearful triggers associated with the trauma. Prolonged Exposure 
(PE; Foa & Rothbaum, 1998; Foa, Rothbaum, Riggs, & Murdock, 1991) aims to modify the 
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trauma memory via imaginal and real-life exposure. In real-life exposure, also called in-vivo, 
survivors expose themselves to anxiety-provoking reminders of the trauma (e.g., the street 
where the accident occurred) to realize that they no longer pose a threat. In imaginal exposure, 
also known as re-living, survivors recount their trauma narrative vividly and repeatedly, to 
achieve habituation to the trauma and its most distressing moments. Ehlers and Clark (2000) 
discuss ‘hot spots’, specific incidents within the trauma memory associated with extreme 
distress. ‘Hot spots’ are suggested to be indicative of the most meaningful elements of the 
trauma, and therefore exposure to ‘hot spots’ rather than to the entire trauma memory is 
hypothesised to be more effective (Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  
Exposure aims to reduce memory-related fear and increase a sense of control over the 
trauma memory. These aims resonate with the idea that re-living enhances VAM-type 
memories and decreases the availability of SAM memories, expressed in the DRT (Brewin et 
al., 1996). In the process of exposure, fear memories are re-encoded from the SAM to the 
VAM, and stored in the past to enable deliberate rather than intrusive recall (Brewin, 2001). 
The mnemonic model (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006a) posits that by reducing the vividness of the 
trauma in memory, exposure obstructs internal and external cues from becoming associated 
with the trauma. Consequently, the trauma is less likely to form part of identity and to lead to 
PTSD symptoms (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006a). In the TCS model (Jobson, 2009) exposure is 
one of the therapeutic techniques hypothesised to lessen the inconsistency caused by PTSD 
symptoms, especially in individuals with high levels of self-consistency. In turn, maladaptive 
attempts to reduce inconsistency (e.g., attempting to emphasize the centrality of the trauma to 
the self) become unnecessary. 
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Cognitive therapy posits that the emotions associated with PTSD do not result from the 
event per se but from survivors’ beliefs and attributions concerning the trauma. The 
modification of maladaptive appraisals is the therapeutic means for the reduction of negative 
affect. Target appraisals might be specific and intrusive negative thoughts or images, or more 
global rules and assumptions about the self and others (Ehlers & Clark, 2000).   
With regards to the impact of the trauma on identity, Brewin (2003) claimed that PTSD 
may destabilize the victim’s positive identity, reinforce a negative identity, or both. For those 
with PTSD, identity can become fragmented, intruded upon by trauma memories and 
cognitions, and changed due to one’s sense that the trauma has come to control one’s mental 
life (Brewin, 2011). Brewin and Holmes (2003) emphasised the need to recognize pre-trauma 
identities and life stories, which, if linked with the trauma narrative, may challenge and change 
negative cognitions and vulnerable identities. Differently, Berntsen and Rubin (2006a) posited 
that excessive attention to the trauma and its impact on identity is therapeutically harmful, as it 
may strengthen the accessibility of the trauma memory.  
Cognitive processing therapy (CPT; Resick & Schnicke, 1992; 1993) is a cognitive 
behavioural model initially developed for the treatment of victims of sexual assault. In CPT, 
clients are asked to write their account of the trauma and their associated feelings, and read 
this daily. Via this daily exposure, feelings resulting from danger, loss and inflicted harm are 
hypothesised to subside (Resick, 2001a). CPT recognizes that certain negative and unrealistic 
thoughts may cause the trauma to become assimilated with pre-existing schemas, and lead to 
unwanted feelings (e.g., shame for thinking “I lured the predator”). These negative beliefs 
often do not decline by exposure alone and require cognitive challenging, to enable appropriate 
accommodation of the trauma alongside other schemas.   
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EMDR (Shapiro, 1995) employs eye movements to stimulate the information-
processing system to ‘unblock’ trauma memories. The eye movement, or another bilateral 
stimulus such as the therapist’s finger tapping, takes place while the patient imagines the 
trauma, its distressing moments and associated negative thoughts. The patient then attempts to 
move away from the traumatic visions and bring to mind new thoughts and images. Unlike 
other trauma-focused approaches, EMDR does not entail real-life exposure to trauma 
reminders, nor does it explore changes to identity.  
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999) is a 
contextualised cognitive behavioural model and therapy. ACT attempts to help clients move 
from perceiving their cognitions as literally true (e.g., “I am a victim because I was repeatedly 
abused”) to viewing them as reflecting a current and temporary perspective. In ACT, over-
identification with the trauma identity is problematic because it defines the survivor at all 
levels of personal existence. This idea agrees with the notion that an overly-consistent self is 
maladaptive. Employing mindfulness approaches, ACT teaches clients to notice ‘good’ or 
‘bad’ cognitive content from the perspective of the present moment, a process which promotes 
being with changing or inconsistent experiences, as an alternative to avoidance (Walser & 
Hayes, 2006).  
Imagery-based approaches (e.g., Hackmann, 1998; Smucker et al., 1995) aim to 
reconstruct the trauma memory in survivors’ imagination. For instance, survivors may imagine 
a safer ending to the trauma. By pairing the original memory with distinct imagined attributes 
generated by the patient (given that self-generated information has been found to be better 
remembered; Hunt & McDaniel, 1993), the reconstructed memory is hypothesised to gain a 
retrieval advantage over the original trauma memory.   
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1.6.3 Evidence for the effectiveness of psychological therapies for PTSD. 
Cognitive behavioural approaches and exposure therapy for PTSD have demonstrated 
their effectiveness in many empirical investigations. The NICE guidance for PTSD (National 
Centre for Health and Clinical Excellence, 2005) reviewed 24 RCTs that showed the efficacy 
of trauma-focused CBT when compared with wait-list or other psychological treatments. A 
review of seven studies of cognitive therapy for PTSD reported improved outcome (Resick, 
2001b). In all studies, cognitive and exposure therapy were associated with clinically 
significant reductions in PTSD symptoms and PTSD diagnosis at the end of treatment (Resick, 
2001b). Trauma- focused CBT has also been associated with faster recovery and reduced re-
experiencing symptoms after five months (Foa, Hearst-Ikeda, & Perry, 1995) and with a 
reduction in the number of participants that met diagnostic criteria for PTSD after six months 
(Bryant, Harvey, Dang, Sackville, & Basten, 1998). In participants with a previous diagnosis 
of chronic PTSD, positive outcome was maintained at six months follow-up (Marks, Lovell, 
Noshirvani, Livanou, & Thrasher, 1998; Resick & Schnicke, 1992; Tarrier et al., 1999). 
Treatment outcome was not associated with time since trauma, trauma history or pre-treatment 
dissociation (Resick, 2001b). Cognitive therapy was shown to be a highly effective treatment 
compared to wait-list, relaxation or supportive counselling. Research into whether cognitive 
therapy alone is as efficacious as cognitive therapy and exposure together was indecisive and 
lacked statistical power (Marks et al., 1998; Tarrier et al., 1999). 
Davidson and Parker (2001), in their meta-analysis of 34 studies, reported that EMDR 
was as effective as exposure and CBT, and more effective when compared with no treatment, 
with nonspecific therapies and with patients’ condition before treatment. 
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ACT has not been formally recommended for the treatment of PTSD, although recent 
research provided evidence for its efficacy (Batten & Hayes, 2005; Follette et al., 1993; 
Twohig, 2009; Walser, Loew, Westrup, Gregg, & Rogers, 2003).  
1.6.4 Effectiveness of pharmacological treatments for PTSD.  
Albucher and Liberzon (2002) provided a comprehensive review of the literature on 
pharmacological interventions for PTSD published between the years 1966-2001. The review 
identified several pharmacotherapies as effective for PTSD. There was evidence supporting the 
use of antidepressants, namely tricyclic antidepressants, monoamine oxidase inhibitors and 
serotonin reuptake inhibitors. Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors appeared as the superior 
treatment, estimated by their reported overall efficacy and side effects. There was emerging 
evidence for mood stabilizers, atypical neuroleptics, adrenergic agents, and newer 
antidepressants. Anxiolytics such as benzodiazepines were not recommended for PTSD, their 
ineffectiveness possibly the result of a rebound effect on discontinuation (Risse et al., 1990). 
The NICE guidance for PTSD (National Centre for Health and Clinical Excellence, 2005) 
suggest trauma-focused psychological interventions first. 
1.6.5 A limitation of the research on treatments for PTSD. 
The research evidence for interventions in the treatment of PTSD is based at large on 
Western, individualistic cultures. Despite the growing awareness that PTSD occurs globally, 
little is known about the treatment of PTSD in non-Western countries. Systemic research is 
needed to evaluate the extent to which psychological and psychopharmacological treatments, 
that are evidence-based in Western, individualistic cultures, are also successful in non-
Western, collectivist cultures (Foa, Keane, Friedman, & Cohen, 2009). A “culturally 
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competent model of traumatic stress” (Osterman & de Jong, 2007, p. 439) has been called for, 
one which accommodates cultural differences within the existing models of PTSD.  
1.7 Rationale for the present study 
Contemporary theories and literature on PTSD and posttraumatic adjustment describe a 
link between PTSD symptoms and identity that is heavily trauma-centred. These are supported 
by a large body of research which shows that PTSD and trauma-centred identity are strongly 
related and predictive of one another. Yet the role that self-consistency plays in this 
relationship has largely been overlooked, with the exception of a few cognitive models that 
regard the influence of self-consistency needs on the development of trauma-centred identity. 
Still, trauma-centred identity, self-consistency and PTSD have only once been investigated 
together. Further to these gaps in knowledge, a consideration of cultural variations in trauma-
centred identity, and cultural differences in what is perceived to be normative or desirable 
levels of self-consistency, has also been absent from this area of research.  
There are clear clinical benefits for adopting more culturally-sensitive understanding 
and treatment approaches for PTSD. Given the rise in migration in modern-day Britain, it 
would be highly necessary to bring these research areas together and investigate whether levels 
of self-consistency are associated with posttraumatic-changes to identity and with PTSD, 
across different cultural groups. Bringing these questions to the cultural arena is mandatory 
given the fact that the current theories of PTSD and treatment guidelines for this condition are 
based almost entirely on studies that tested Western, individualistic participants. Therefore the 
applicability of these approaches to non-individualistic cultures is perhaps limited.  
The present study aimed to investigate cultural differences in self-consistency and their 
relationship with trauma-centred identity and PTSD symptoms, in trauma-exposed community 
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participants from two cultural groups: British and Soviets. British have been recognized as an 
individualistic culture (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2004). Former-USSR nationalities, or Soviets1, 
have been identified as a collectivistic culture (Smith, Dugan, & Trompennars, 1996). As 
concluded from this introductory chapter, cultural variations in self-consistency with relation 
to PTSD have not been empirically researched as of yet. Therefore, this study investigated the 
relationship between self-consistency and PTSD symptoms in British and Soviet participants. 
It additionally examined identity, and its association with culture, levels of self-consistency 
and trauma exposure. This study employed several measures to assess the centrality of trauma 
to identity, including the CES, a measure which has not been previously used with 
collectivistic cultures.  
1.8 Research Questions 
The overall objective of this study was to examine the relationships between self-
consistency, trauma-centred identity and PTSD, in community samples of British 
(individualistic culture) and Soviet (collectivistic culture) trauma survivors. In light of the 
evidence reviewed beforehand, and the aims of the present study, the following research 
questions were addressed: 
1. Do British have higher levels of self-consistency than Soviets? 
2. Are there differences in the levels of trauma-centred identity between British and 
Soviets? 
3. Is trauma-centred identity and posttraumatic symptoms associated in British and 
Soviets? 
                                                           
1
 The term soviets is used to refer to individuals from former Soviet Union states. It was chosen in consultation 
with individuals from the former USSR, as a sufficiently general term inclusive of this vast geo-political region.  
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4. Is self-consistency and posttraumatic symptoms associated in British and Soviets? 
5. Is self-consistency and trauma-centred identity associated in British and Soviets? 
 
In relation to these questions one hypothesis was generated. In terms of the first 
research question, given the evidence concerning lower levels of self-consistency in members 
of collectivistic cultures compared with individualistic cultures (Suh, 2002), this study 
predicted that Soviet participants would display significantly lower self-consistency levels 
than British participants. Regarding the other questions, previous research had been too 
dissimilar to the present study to enable hypotheses to be generated. Trauma-centred identity 
has never before been compared cross-culturally in British and Soviet samples. Webb and 
Jobson (2011) reported findings in an individualistic culture only, and examined posttraumatic 
symptom clusters when the effects of depression were statistically removed, whereas the 
present study aims to examine posttraumatic symptoms as a whole, without the removal of 
depression. Therefore, with the exception of the hypothesis pertaining to the first question, the 
subsequent four research questions remained as questions. 
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2 Method 
2.1 Design 
 The current study used a cross-sectional between group design with an individualistic 
culture (British) and a collectivistic culture (Soviet).  
2.2 Participants 
Trauma survivors from the general community born in Britain or in the former USSR 
were recruited. Britain has been recognized as an individualistic culture (Hofstede & Hofstede, 
2004) whereas Russia and other former USSR states have been classified as a collectivist 
culture (Smith, Dugan, & Trompennars, 1996; Triandis, 1995). A community sample was 
chosen for several reasons. First, sampling from the general community appeared appropriate 
for further examining the relationships between trauma-centred identity, self-consistency and 
PTSD previously identified in a student population (Webb & Jobson, 2011). Second, trauma-
centred identity has been found to be associated with PTSD in nonclinical populations (e.g., 
Robinaugh & McNally, 2011). Finally, varying levels of self-consistency have been reported 
in community samples (e.g., Diehl & Hay, 2010).  
Potential participants had to be older than 18 and identify their ethnicity as either 
British or as one of the 15 countries that formed the former Soviet Union (present-day Russia, 
Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). Only those who 
reported at least one trauma event on the Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS; Foa et al., 
1997) were included (i.e., those who had not experienced a Criterion A type trauma were 
excluded, n = 6). No further exclusion criteria were applied because the study aimed to gain 
representative samples of the British population and the Soviet community living in Britain.  
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The power calculation was based on within-group correlation analyses, the least 
powerful test from among the range of planned analyses. Previous research found medium-
strong associations between PTSD symptoms and trauma-centred identity (Jobson & 
O’Kearney, 2008; McNally et al., 1995; Sutherland & Bryant, 2008). Self-consistency was not 
significantly associated with posttraumatic symptoms (when the effects of depression were not 
controlled for) and with trauma-centred identity in an individualistic culture (Webb & Jobson, 
2011). The relationships between self-consistency, PTSD and trauma-centred identity have not 
yet been tested in collectivistic cultures. Therefore, a medium effect size was employed (.3), 
with power level .80 and significance level .05. This calculation indicated a required sample 
size of 128 (64 participants per group).  
One hundred and three people participated in the study and six of those were excluded 
as they did not experience a traumatic event (three British, three Soviets). Of the remaining 97 
participants, 37 participants (38%) were in the Soviet group and 60 participants (62%) were in 
the British group. In the Soviet group, there were seven males (18.9%), 29 females (78.4%), 
and one participant did not disclose their gender. The age range was 19 to 61, mean age 37.6 
(SD = 9.8). As for nationality, 33 participants (89.2%) were Russian, two (5.4%) were 
Ukrainian, one was Belarusian and one Uzbekistani (2.7%, each). Participants in the Soviet 
group reported that they had been living in the UK on average 7 years (range 0-26, SD= 5.3). 
The British group had 11 males (18.3%) and 49 females (81.7%). Their age ranged between 18 
and 76, mean age 39.8 (SD = 16.8). They had all (100%) described their nationality as 
British/English/ UK. Participants in the British group had been living in the UK for an average 
of 38.3 years (range 18-76, SD= 16.4).  
 
  
52 
 
2.3 Measures 
2.3.1 Translation. 
Participants in the Soviet group received Russian versions of the measures. Providing 
translated measures aimed to maximize participants’ understanding. In addition, presenting the 
measures in Russian aimed to prime collectivistic tendencies in participants in the Soviet 
group. Priming is defined as a form of manipulation. When a concept is primed, the ideas 
related to it in one’s memory are cued as well (Neely, 1977). Language is associated with 
culture, memory, and cognition (e.g., Chiu, Leung, & Kwan, 2007; Wang & Ross, 2007). 
Therefore, language in itself may be used to prime individualism and collectivism. In members 
of collectivistic cultures who live in Western countries, their mother-tongue languages hold 
knowledge about the home, collectivistic culture, whereas languages such as English activate 
individualistic tendencies because they are associated with Anglo-Saxon cultures (Oyserman 
& Lee, 2008). A recent review of studies that primed cultures showed that the use of language 
to prime individualism or collectivism had a moderate effect size (Oyserman & Lee, 2008). 
Language was found to prime culture and identity differences in Russian bilingual participants 
socialized in different cultures (Marian & Kaushanskaya, 2004). Speaking English was 
associated with a more individualistic self-construal while speaking Russian related to a more 
collectivist self, suggesting that language triggers cultural influences which in turn influence 
self-concepts (Marian & Kaushanskaya, 2004).  
Two of the study measures were translated to Russian in previous research: the 
Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS; Foa et al., 1997; E. Gilboa-Shechtman, personal 
communication, May 4, 2011) and the Hopkins Symptom Checklist (HSCL-25; Derogatis, 
Lipman, Rickels, & Cori, 1974; Hoffmann et al., 2006). The remaining measures were 
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translated for the purpose of this study. Beaton, Bombardier, Guillemin, and Ferraz (2000) 
provided a review and guidelines for cross-cultural translation of self-report measures. The 
guidelines emphasize both a linguistic translation as well as cultural adaptation, to preserve the 
content validity of the original measure. In line with these guidelines, the present translation 
was a two-step process. Initially, the measures were translated from English to Russian by a 
first translator whose mother tongue was Russian. Next, a second translator who was blind to 
the original version translated the measures back from Russian to English. The latter 
translation was examined by the researcher to ensure that the translated version maintained the 
original item contents. Differences between the original and translated versions were discussed 
with the second translator and adaptations were incorporated into the translation.  
Returned Russian questionnaires were translated to English. A first translator whose 
mother tongue was Russian translated 100% of the completed measures. A second translator 
whose mother tongue was Russian translated 20% of the completed measures to ensure the 
reliability of the translations. The translations were provided in Word files which were similar 
in appearance to the files that contained the responses of participants in the British group. 
Thus, raters were able to remain blind to participants’ culture when rating the questionnaires. 
2.3.2 Self-Consistency. 
 Self-consistency is a state of internal and cross-situational coherence, a consistent view 
of the self as well as consistency across roles and contexts (Boucher, 2011; Cross et al., 2003). 
The Self-Consistency Index (SCI; see Appendix A) has been used in research to estimate self-
consistency (e.g., Webb & Jobson, 2011) in community samples (e.g., Donahue et al., 1993). 
The SCI consists of two parts. Initially, participants rated the extent to which certain 
personality traits describe their “general self” on a 7-point Likert scale (not at all like myself to 
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very much like myself). Following Suh’s (2002) procedure, participants were then required to 
complete a number of scales that were unrelated to self-consistency (the remaining study 
measures). Following this, participants rated how accurately the former personality traits 
describe them in the context of different interpersonal relationships. Baird, Le, and Lucas 
(2006) reported that individuals who were inconsistent across one set of contexts were also 
inconsistent across a different set of contexts. Therefore, the specific types of contexts chosen 
for the SCI should not affect the scores. Three interpersonal contexts were used in this study: 
self with romantic partner, parent, and friend. They were chosen given Suh’s (2002) findings, 
in which student/community participants indicated that the three most significant people with 
whom they interact frequently are parents, romantic partners and same-gender friends.  
The number of personality traits that are used in the SCI varies among studies. The 
present study used 16 traits, as Donahue et al. (1993) reported similar findings when 
employing 16 and 60 personality traits. A smaller number of traits was also deemed as less 
fatiguing for participants. The 16 traits are found within the SCI in Appendix A. Of those, 12 
adjectives are broad personality traits suitable to most social contexts  (e.g., tolerant, serious) 
composed in reference to the Big Five traits (Goldberg, 1993) and used in previous research 
(e.g., Suh, 2002; Webb & Jobson, 2011). To supplement the former traits with ones that relate 
to trauma, four additional adjectives (defeated, influential, secure and victim) were chosen for 
the present study from the four cognitive appraisal domains (mental defeat, control, alienation 
and permanent change) in Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) cognitive model of PTSD.  
The order of appearance of each trait*context was randomised using the Excel 
programme. For the randomisation process, a set of random numbers was produced and 
assigned to each of the 48 trait*interpersonal context pairs. Next, the assigned random 
  
55 
 
numbers were put in number order, so that the trait*context items became randomly ordered. 
The final order of the 48 items was identical for each participant. 
The index score on the SCI is the percentage of variance explained by the first factor. It 
can range between 0% and 100%. Higher values denote increased levels of self-consistency, 
therefore participants with higher SCI scores had more consistent self perceptions across the 
interpersonal contexts (e.g., relaxed across all situations). Participants with lower SCI scores 
had less consistent self perceptions across contexts (e.g., relaxed with a friend but not with a 
parent).   
The SCI correlates with theoretically and logically expected variables. Suh (2002) 
reported that high SCIs were positively correlated with self-clarity (r = .37; the Self-Concept 
Clarity Scale; Campbell et al., 1996), and with assertiveness (r = .23; the Assertiveness 
subscale of the NEO–PI–R Extraversion; Costa & McCrae, 1992). Suh (2002) also reported 
that SCI scores negatively correlated with the level of interest in how one is viewed by others 
(r = -.21; the Self-Monitoring Scale; Snyder, 1974) and with a measure that captures self-
definition through the perspectives of others (r = -.42; the Social Awareness Inventory; 
Sheldon, 1996). Concerning the relationship between SCI and PTSD, Webb and Jobson (2011) 
reported that when the effects of depression were partialled out, SCI scores correlated 
positively with the intrusion symptoms of PTSD (rho = .17). While reliability statistics are not 
available for the SCI, the Big Five traits (Goldberg, 1993) on which the index is based was 
found to have a .73 test-retest reliability over 4 years (Robins, Fraley, Roberts, & 
Trzesniewski, 2002).  
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2.3.3 Cultural independence/interdependence. 
The Twenty Statement Test (TST; Kuhn & MacPartland, 1954; see Appendix A) is a 
self-report assessment of self-conceptualization across interpersonal relationships, roles and 
internal qualities. Researchers often employ the TST to measure cultural variation in sense of 
self (e.g., Bochner, 1994). The TST asks "Who Am I?", subsequently providing participants 
with 20 empty response statements that begin with “I am”. Although most studies employ the 
20-item version of the TST, Bochner (Bochner, 1976; Bochner & Perks, 1971) reported that 
participants tended to give up, repeat themselves or provide trivial answers after seven 
statements. McPartland (1959) described partly completed protocols of the 20-item version of 
the TST, where respondents discontinued after six responses. Therefore, following Bochner’s 
(1994) methodology, this study asked for 10 responses.  
The TST has acceptable psychometric properties. Madson and Trafimow (2001) 
reported high (K = .98) interrater reliability, and Kuhn and McPartland (1954) described high 
test–retest reliability (r = .85). Criterion validity was reported in Jackson and Smith’s (1999) 
study, as TST responses pertaining to groups correlated significantly with a host of social 
identity measures (e.g., r = .19 on the Collective Self-Esteem Scale; Luhtanen & Crocker, 
1992). As for face validity, participants in Spitzer and Parker’s (1976) study felt that the TST 
enabled them to provide the most accurate descriptions of themselves, compared with a range 
of self-construct measures. It was described as allowing “to communicate a degree of 
uniqueness not permitted by fixed response instruments” (Spitzer & Parker, 1976, p. 241).This 
favourable attitude towards the TST was suggested to promote participants’ degree of 
cooperation, effort and truthfulness (Spitzer & Parker, 1976).  
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Members of individualistic cultures have continuously been shown to use self-
definitions that concern private, inner aspects (e.g.,” I am nice”), whereas members of 
collectivistic cultures are characterised by a greater proportion of self-definitions related to 
public aspects of the self and social roles (e.g., “I am a wife”). Participants’ responses on the 
TST were used to derive individualistic and collectivistic indices. In line with Jobson and 
O’Kearney’s (2008) methodology, participants’ statements were coded into independent/ 
interdependent categories. Private, self-related attributions, beliefs, thoughts and actions that 
did not involve others (e.g., “I am nice”, “I am strong”) were coded as independent responses. 
Replies that regarded groups or categories (e.g., “I am Russian”, “I am a father”) and those 
that referred to interdependence, companionship and other persons’ attributes (e.g., “I am a 
mate”) were coded as interdependent responses. Participant indices were computed by 
dividing the number of independent/ interdependent responses by the total number of 
statements provided. Index individualistic/ collectivistic scores can range 0-1. Following the 
translation of the responses of participants in the Soviet group from Russian to English, the 
investigator rated all responses and a second rater who is bilingual and from a Soviet cultural 
group rated 20% of the responses. Raters were blind to participants’ culture. Interrater 
reliability was κ = .90 for the two raters.  
2.3.4 Trauma-centred identity. 
 Three measures of trauma-centred identity were used; the Centrality of Event Scale, 
self-defining memories and the TST. 
The Centrality of Events Scale (CES; Berntsen & Rubin, 2006a; see Appendix A) is a 
self-report questionnaire that assesses the predominance of a stressful life event in 
respondents’ identity. The CES has 20 items that are rated on a 5-point Likert scale (totally 
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disagree to totally agree). Respondents are instructed to complete the CES with regards to the 
most traumatic/stressful event they endured. The final scale score is the sum of responses, 
ranging from 20 to 100.   
The CES has good internal reliability (α = .94) and a factor analysis indicated that a 
single concept underlies the scale (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006a). The scale correlates .38 with the 
severity of PTSD symptoms as measured with the PTSD checklist (Blanchard, Jones-
Alexander, Buckley, & Foneris, 1996; Weathers et al., 1993). The CES also correlates .23 
with depression symptoms measured with the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, 
Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961; Berntsen & Rubin, 2006a). Psychometric properties for 
the CES were gathered from participants from individualistic cultures (Berntsen & Rubin, 
2006a). This is the first study to use the CES with a collectivistic culture. 
Second, the self-defining memories task (SDM; see Appendix A) asks participants to 
briefly write five self-defining memories. Following Singer and Salovey’s (1993) 
methodology, participants are instructed that a self-defining memory is an important, well-
remembered memory that “helps you to understand who you are and conveys powerfully how 
you have come to be the person you currently are”. The SDM task was used in research with 
community samples from individualistic and collectivistic cultures, to estimate trauma-themed 
identity (Jobson & O’Kearney’s, 2008).  
Each autobiographical memory was coded as trauma-themed (directly referring to a 
traumatic event listed in the PDS; Foa et al., 1997) or not. Examples of participants’ memories 
are provided (see Appendix B). Following Jobson and O’Kearney (2006; 2008) and 
Sutherland and Bryant (2006), the number of trauma-themed memories was divided by the 
total number of self-defining memories to obtain individual trauma-themed SDM ratios. 
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Hence, the possible SDM ratio range was 0-1. To establish interrater reliability, following the 
translation of the responses of participants in the Soviet group from Russian to English, the 
investigator rated all responses and a second rater who is bilingual and from a Soviet cultural 
group rated 20% of the responses. Raters were blind to participants’ culture. Interrater 
reliability was κ =.86 for the two raters. Singer and Blagov (2000) reported an interrater 
reliability range for the SDM, κ= .64 to .83, for two raters.  
Third, given the TST (Kuhn & MacPartland, 1954) has previously been used to 
examine self-definition (e.g., Bigner, 1971; Jobson & O’Kearney, 2006), it was also used in 
this study to examine trauma-themed self-definition in addition to independence/ 
interdependence. To be coded as trauma-themed, a response had to clearly relate to trauma/ 
survival (e.g., “victim”). Following Jobson and O’Kearney’s (2008) procedure, an individual 
trauma-themed ratio was obtained by dividing each participant’s total number of trauma-
themed statements by their overall number of TST responses. The possible trauma-themed 
TST ratios range is therefore 0-1. Once more, following the translation of the responses of 
participants in the Soviet group from Russian to English, the investigator rated all responses 
and a second rater who is bilingual and from a Soviet cultural group rated 20% of the 
responses. Raters were blind to participants’ culture. Interrater reliability was κ = .91. 
2.3.5 Posttraumatic symptoms. 
 The PDS (Foa et al., 1997; see Appendix A) is a 49-item self-report measure of PTSD, 
widely used in research and clinical settings. The PDS measures every one of the PTSD 
diagnostic criteria (A-F) outlined in the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). 
The scale is unique to many other PTSD measures in asking about participants’ trauma 
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histories and about the nature of the most distressing event experienced, which can enhance 
the interpretation of findings. The PDS has been used with collectivistic cultures (Garcia, 
2005).  
 The PDS contains four parts. The first two ask about trauma history and screen for the 
DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) PTSD stressor criteria (A). In part three, 
respondents rate the severity and duration of 17 symptoms that correspond with the core PTSD 
diagnostic symptoms (criteria B through E) from 0 ("not at all or only one time") to 3 ("5 or 
more times a week / almost always"). Part Four concerns the extent to which respondents’ 
symptoms affected their level of functioning over the past month (criteria F). The PDS 
provides an overall severity score (ranging 0-51) of the frequency of the 17 PTSD symptoms. 
Scores on the PDS can be used to obtain a preliminary DSM-IV PTSD diagnosis, a symptom 
count, a symptom severity rating, and an indication of functional impairment (Norris & 
Hamblen, 2004).  
 Norms for the PDS were derived from respondents with PTSD and from at-risk 
populations, who had experienced an array of distressing events (Foa et al., 1997). The scale 
has excellent psychometric properties. Foa et al. (1997) reported overall internal consistency 
alpha coefficient of .92 and internal consistency for symptom subscales ranging from .78 to 
.84. Test- retest reliability of PTSD diagnosis had 87% agreement (κ = .74). As for convergent 
validity, diagnoses based on the PDS were in 82% agreement (κ = .65) with those based on the 
PTSD module of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-III-R (Spitzer, Williams, Gibbon, 
& First, 1990). The PDS also correlated .78 with posttraumatic symptoms as measured with 
the Revised Impact of Events Scale (Weiss & Marmar, 1997) and .79 with depression 
symptoms measured with the BDI (Beck et al., 1961).  
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2.3.6 Depressive symptoms. 
 Depression was measured as it was found to mediate the relationships between 
intrusive PTSD symptoms, self-consistency and trauma-centred identity (Webb & Jobson, 
2011). The Hopkins Symptom Checklist (HSCL-25; Derogatis et al., 1974) is a 25-item 
symptom inventory that measures symptoms of anxiety and depression. Part II of the scale has 
15 items that measure depressive symptoms (see appendix A). Respondents rate symptom 
severity over the last week on a 4-point Likert scale (1= not at all to 4= extremely). The total 
depression score is the average of all 15 items (range 1-4). The HSCL-25 has often been used 
in cross-cultural studies (e.g., Jobson & O’Kearney, 2008). 
Derogatis et al. (1974) reported good internal, test-retest and interrater reliabilities 
(alpha coefficients .86, .81 and .64, respectively) for Part II of the HSCL-25. As for validity, 
Part II was highly correlated (r= .77) with depressive symptoms as measured with the 
Montgomery-Asberg-Depression Rating Scale (Montgomery & Asberg, 1979). Part-II was 
reported to have high (94%) sensitivity for identifying depression as defined by the DSM-IV 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994) criteria, as well as high (94%) specifity for 
differentiating between different types of depression (Frojdh, Hakansson, & Karlsson, 2004).  
2.3.7 Demographics. 
 Participants were asked to provide their age, gender, nationality and length of time in 
the UK, and to rate how hard they found the study on a 10-point Likert scale (not at all to 
extremely). These questions are enclosed in Appendix A.  
2.4 Ethical Considerations 
 The study received ethical approval by the National Research Ethics Services (NRES)– 
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Norfolk Research Ethics Committee (see appendix C). People who responded to the study 
advertisements received information about the study from the researcher and a study 
information sheet in English/ Russian (see appendix D). The information sheet provided 
details about the study, requirements from participants, consent/voluntary nature of 
participation, matters of confidentiality and anonymity, data storage throughout the study, data 
disposal at the end of the study, support for distress, participants’ right to withdraw, the 
complaints procedure, the offer to receive information about the study findings and the option 
to participate in the prize draw. The information sheet also informed participants that by 
returning the completed questionnaires they were giving their consent to participate.  
2.4.1 Confidentiality. 
Potential participants were informed that participation was voluntary and that they 
could change their mind about participating at any time prior to returning their completed 
questionnaires. If individuals chose to withdraw from the study they did not need to provide a 
reason and there were no consequences. The study questionnaires did not require identifiable 
information. However, participants had to provide their postal/electronic address to send the 
questionnaires. Participants that wished to enter the prize draw or to receive feedback about 
the study were asked to provide their contact details, either in a separate part of the online 
questionnaires or in a separate sealed envelope included with the paper questionnaires (see 
Appendix A). Contact details were separated from the questionnaires and kept apart so they 
could not be linked with participants’ responses. The contact information was destroyed 
following the prize draw and provision of feedback about the study.   
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2.4.2 Data storage.  
 During the time of the study, electronic data was encrypted and password-protected on 
two computer files. Paper data was kept in a locked cabinet. The electronic and paper data 
were only accessible to the researcher and supervisors. At the end of the study, a password-
protected file with the study data was saved on a portable memory device to be stored securely 
at the University of East Anglia for 15 years. The remaining data was deleted or shredded. 
2.4.3 Distress. 
 Participants were asked to answer questions about distressing events they have 
experienced, about how they perceive themselves in general, and complete the PDS and 
HSCL-25-Part II. These measures have all been used previously with community samples 
(e.g., Bochner, 1994). Although it was unlikely for any harm to come to participants as a result 
of their participation, the researchers endeavoured to reduce and respond to distress in the 
following way. One, participants were informed at each stage of the study (i.e., study 
advertisements, information sheet and start of study questionnaires) that the study asked about 
distressing events. Second, the information sheet clearly stated that there was no requirement 
to complete the measures and that participants could discontinue prior to returning the 
questionnaires. Third, if participants became distressed they could withdraw from the study 
without consequences. Lastly, the information sheets, both in English and in Russian, 
contained the researchers’ contact details together with sources of help and support (GP and 
the Samaritans helpline), for participants to contact if they feel distress. 
2.5 Procedure 
 The study was advertised in Russian and in English via posters in public places, 
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advertisements in local newspapers, existing contacts with key Soviet community members, 
police services, hospitals and health services. These advertisements were identical (see 
appendix E). They invited British and Soviet people to participate in a study about distressing 
events, identity and culture, for which they could enter a prize draw. Interested individuals 
contacted the researcher by phone or email. The researcher provided additional information 
about the study from the information sheet. Those who were interested could choose to receive 
the study questionnaires in one of the following three methods: 1. in person, meet the 
researcher and complete the questionnaires in her presence; 2. electronically, a website link to 
complete the questionnaires online sent to their email address; 3. in paper, sent to their postal 
address. The questionnaires were accompanied with a study information sheet and an 
instructions letter. The information sheet informed participants that by returning their 
completed questionnaires, either in person, by post or online, they were giving their consent to 
participate in the study. The instructions letter directed participants to complete the study 
measures in one sitting and in the following order: SCI-part I, SDM, CES, PDS, HSCL-25, 
TST, SCI-part II, and demographics. It also provided an estimation of 30-45 minutes as to the 
length of time necessary for the completion of the questionnaires. 
 None of the individuals who contacted the researcher chose to complete the study in 
person. Participants who chose the online version of the study received an email with the study 
instructions in English/ Russian (see Appendix F), an information sheet as an attached file, as 
well as two webpage links. The first link was for the online version of the study 
questionnaires, which were presented in the same order as described above. The second link 
was for a separate webpage in which participants could enter their contact details for the prize 
draw and/or study feedback. In this way, participants’ contact details were deposited in a 
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location separate to their responses. The online version was available either in English or in 
Russian, depending on participants’ stated nationality when initially contacting the researcher. 
Those who chose to participate by post were sent an instructions letter (see Appendix 
A) detailing the procedure outlined above, along with the information sheet, questionnaires, a 
small envelope with a contact details sheet to enter the prize draw and/or study feedback and a 
stamped return envelope. As in the online condition, the information sheet informed that by 
returning the completed questionnaires, they were consenting to participate in the study. Either 
English or Russian questionnaires were sent, depending on participants’ stated nationality 
when initially contacting the researcher. 
 Of the 376 people who contacted the researcher, 103 completed the study (a response 
rate of 27%). Retuned questionnaires were allocated to a study group according to participants’ 
stated nationality in the demographics questionnaire. Following Hofstede and Hofstede’s 
(2004) individualism/collectivism categorization of cultures, participants identifying 
themselves as British were included in the individualistic group, and participants who 
identified themselves as members of a former Soviet Union state were included in the 
collectivistic group. None of those who participated belonged to another culture. In line with 
the study inclusion criteria, participants that had not reported a traumatic event on the PDS 
(Foa et al., 1997) were not included. The data were analysed using the Statistical Package for 
Social Sciences (SPSS Inc., Chicago, Illinois, USA) for Windows (Version 17), and analysed 
as described in the ‘plan of analysis’ below. 
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2.6 Plan of Analysis 
To examine the first research question concerning cultural differences in trauma-
centred identity, pairwise comparisons were used to compare the groups on the CES, SDM 
and TST. To examine the second research question concerning cultural differences in self-
consistency, one-tailed t-tests were employed to examine whether SCI scores were higher in 
British compared with Soviets. To investigate the third research question, correlation analyses 
were conducted to examine correlations between PTSD symptoms and each of the three 
identity measures (CES, SDM and trauma-themed TST) in each group. For the fourth 
question, correlation analyses were used to estimate correlations between PTSD symptoms 
and self-consistency in each group. For the fifth question, correlation analyses were conducted 
to measure correlations between self-consistency and each of the three identity measures in 
each group. Fisher’s transformation was used to examine group differences in the correlation 
coefficients described above. 
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3 Results 
This chapter begins with the descriptive statistics of the sample characteristics. These 
are followed by analyses, to ensure that the results were not influenced by data collection 
method. Next, the descriptive statistics of the data are provided. Parametric statistics and non-
parametric statistics are used based on the normality of distributions, to examine group 
differences and to compute relationships between the main study variables. These analyses and 
their findings are described in relation to the first five research questions. Due to missing data, 
sample size and degrees of freedom vary by analysis. The majority of analyses are two-tailed. 
One-tailed statistics are used in analyses pertaining to the second research question, in which 
the direction of the relationships between variables was predicted. Two exploratory analyses 
are carried. Bootstrapping analyses are used to examine mediating variables, and consistency 
levels are compared between trauma-related and non-trauma traits. Finally, a summary of the 
main findings is presented. 
3.1 Overview of Data Analysis 
3.1.1 Examining the Normality of the Data. 
First, data were examined for outliers and none were detected. Second, as participants’ 
form of participation in the study (on-line or post) may have influenced findings, pairwise 
comparisons (t tests or Mann-Whitney U tests) were conducted to establish whether there had 
been significant differences between the two methods of data collection. No significant 
differences existed between those who completed the study on-line (n = 87) or by post (n =10) 
concerning levels of self-consistency, t(94) = .30, p =.77, posttraumatic symptoms, t(95) = .92, 
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p =.36, or levels of trauma-centred identity as measured with the CES, U = 313.5, Z= -1.40, 
p=.16. In light of these results, the method of data collection did not appear to have influenced 
participants’ responses.  
 Group summary data for the Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS; Foa et al., 1997), 
the Centrality of Events Scale (CES; Berntsen & Rubin, 2006a), trauma-themed self-defining 
memories (SDM), trauma-themed Twenty Statement Test ratios (Trauma-themed TST; Kuhn 
& MacPartland, 1954), levels of self-consistency (SCI), TST cultural independence ratios and 
depression scores on the Hopkins Symptom Checklist (HSCL-25; Derogatis et al., 1974) are 
presented in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Normality Data for Study Measures by Group 
 
M SD Skewness SE of 
Skewness 
Range 
 
British   Soviet British   Soviet British    Soviet British  Soviet British Soviet 
PDS 13.03       14.30 10.03     10.43      .80**       .82**    .31     .39 0-38           0-41 
CES 73.80       58.68 16.00     21.23 -1.02**      -.06 .31     .39 28-96       23-91 
SDM      .31          .20     .23        .23   .36       1.36*** .31     .39 0- .8            0-1 
Trauma-themed 
TST 
    .03           .02     .05         .04 2.12***     .66*** .31     .39 0-.20         0-.10 
SCI 67.46       64.30 13.50    11.58   .09          -.37 .31     .39 40.60-       36.62- 
92.69        83.62 
Independence 
ratio 
    .86           .86     .13          .17 -.68**     -1.17** .31     .39  .50-1          .40-1 
HSCL-25   1.94         1.93     .66         .66   .44           .65 .31     .39  1.00-          1.07-      
3.53            3.47 
Note. PDS stands for the Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale; CES stands for the Centrality of Events 
Scale; SDM stands for the self defining memories; TST stands for the Twenty Statements Test; SCI 
stands for the Self-Consistency Index; HSCL-25 stands for the Hopkins Symptom Checklist. 
Significantly skewed variables tested by using the Wald statistic (skewness/SE of skewness) 
** significant at p < .01 
*** significant at p < .001 
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3.1.2 A description of posttraumatic symptoms. 
Posttraumatic symptoms were measured using the PDS (Foa et al., 1997). As indicated 
in Table 2, PDS scores were significantly negatively skewed. Square-root transformations 
yielded normally skewed distributions in the Soviet (skew = -.27; SE = .39, n.s.) and British 
(skew = -.31; SE = .31, n.s.) groups.   
 3.1.3 A description of trauma-centred identity. 
Trauma-centred identity was measured using the CES (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006a), 
SDM, and the TST (Kuhn & MacPartland, 1954). Table 2 shows that the CES was 
significantly positively skewed in the British group and maintained a significant positive skew 
despite statistical transformations (p < .01). Following square-root transformations, the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality showed that the distribution of the transformed CES 
scores did not differ significantly from normality in the Soviet group only, D(37) = 0.11,         
p = .20. Therefore, subsequent analyses used non-parametric tests with the non-transformed 
scores. 
SDM ratios were normally skewed in the British group but significantly negatively 
skewed in the Soviet group, and remained so despite statistical transformations (p < .001). As 
indicated by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality carried with and without statistical 
transformations, the distributions of SDM ratio scores remained non-normal in the Soviet, 
D(36) = 0.25, p < .001, and British, D(60) = 0.18, p < .001, groups. Thus, subsequent analyses 
employed non-parametric tests with the non-transformed scores. 
 Table 2 shows that in both groups, trauma-themed TST ratios were significantly 
negatively skewed. A significant negative skew remained in both groups despite statistical 
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transformations (p < .001). The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality was carried out with 
and without statistical transformations and the trauma-themed TST ratio distributions remained 
non-normal in the Soviet, D(37) = .49, p < .001, and British, D(60) = .48, p< .001, groups. 
Therefore, subsequent analyses involving the trauma-themed TST employed non-parametric 
tests with the non-transformed scores. 
Correlation coefficients were calculated between each pair of the three trauma-identity 
measures for each group. SDM and trauma-themed TST were significantly correlated in the 
Soviet group (rho = .33, p =.047) and approached significance in the British group (rho = .24, 
p = .06). SDM and CES were not significantly correlated in the Soviet (rho = -.10, p = .58) and 
British (rho = -.03, p = .81) groups. CES and trauma-themed TST were not significantly 
correlated in the Soviet (rho = -.02, p = .89) and British (rho = -.19, p = .15) groups. 
 3.1.4 A description of self-consistency. 
 Levels of self-consistency were estimated by computing a self-consistency index (SCI). 
Each participant’s 64 ratings were transformed into a 16 x 4 matrix (16 traits in four contexts - 
parent, romantic partner, friend and the general self). Next, every personal matrix was factor 
analysed, that is, a within-subjects factor analysis was carried to obtain the principle 
components factors. An adjustment was made in two cases in which participants made 
identical ratings across one interpersonal context, which resulted with zero variance and thus, 
it was impossible to compute a component analysis in SPSS. Using the Jackknife estimate 
(Efron, 1979) in each of the two cases, 16 values of the index were systematically calculated 
whereby each of the identical ratings was in turn replaced by the next lower value (i.e., a rating 
of 4 replaced with 3). The resulting set of 16 scores was then averaged to obtain a final index 
value, as there was variability depending on which value was replaced. 
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 Table 2 shows that SCI results were not significantly skewed in the Soviet (skew = -
.37, SE = .39, n.s.) and British (skew = .09, SE = .31, n.s) groups. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests 
showed that SCI scores did not differ significantly from normality in the Soviet, D(36) = .08, p 
= .20., and British, D(60) = .07, p = .20, groups. 
3.1.5 A description of cultural independence. 
Table 2 shows that in both groups, the independence ratios were positively skewed. 
Using square-root transformation, the skew of the independence ratio in the British sample 
became normal (p > .05), but it remained non-normally skewed in the Soviet group. 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests carried with and without statistical transformations showed that in 
both groups, individualistic and collectivistic index scores were significantly non-normal. 
 3.1.6 A description of depressive symptoms. 
Table 2 shows that the depression scores in both groups were negatively skewed. 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests showed that depression scores were significantly non-normal in 
Soviets, D(37), .17, p < .05, whereas they did not differ significantly from normality in British, 
D(60), .10, p = .20. 
3.1.7 Internal reliability. 
Internal reliabilities of the PDS and CES were explored using Cronbach’s alpha.  The 
Cronbach’s alpha for internal consistency of the PDS was .91 in the British group and .89 in 
the Soviet group. Internal consistency for the CES was also high, Cronbach’s alpha = .95 in 
the Soviet group and = .93 in the British group. Therefore, non-normal distributions of the 
  
72 
 
PDS and CES are unlikely to have been caused by the consistency of the scales in the two 
samples. 
3.1.8 Summary of descriptive data. 
As seen in the descriptive statistics, SCI scores were normally distributed in both 
groups. The three trauma-centred identity measures (CES, SDM and trauma-themed TST), 
cultural independence and HSCL-25 were not normally distributed in both groups. PDS scores 
were initially non-normally distributed but square-root transformations achieved normally 
skewed distributions. In line with these findings, non-parametric tests were employed in 
analyses that included trauma-centred identity measures. 
3.2 Group Characteristics 
Group scores for age, gender, self-rated study difficulty, depression symptoms (HSCL-
25 scores), cultural independence (TST independence ratio), and trauma exposure and PTSD 
symptom severity scores derived from the PDS, are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 
Group Characteristics 
 
Age Gender 
Study 
Difficulty 
Depression 
Symptoms 
Cultural 
Independence 
Trauma 
Exposure 
PTSD 
Severity 
 
M (SD) Male (%) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Soviet 37.64 (9.8) 7 (19) 4.58 (.39) 1.93 (.11) .86 (.03) 2.73 (.29) 
14.30 
(1.72) 
British 39.76 (16.8) 11 (18) 4.05 (.36) 1.94 (.09) .86 (.02) 2.25 (.19) 13.03 
(1.41) 
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There were no significant differences between the two cultural groups in terms of age, 
t(95) = -.78, p = .44; gender, X 2(1, N = 97) = 1.66, p = .44; self-rated study difficulty, 
t(94)=.96, p =.34; depression symptoms, U = 1103.5, z=-.05, p =.96; and cultural 
independence , U = 1043.5, z=-.52, p =.61. Additional correlation analyses indicated that the 
length of time participants had been living in the UK was not significantly associated with 
cultural independence, r = .07, p = .41. Despite the absence of group differences in the cultural 
dimension of cultural independence, the groups remained separate in subsequent analyses due 
to differences in participants’ country of origin (UK or former USSR).   
The groups did not differ with respect to PTSD symptom severity, t(95) = .96, p = .34, 
and number of past traumatic experiences, t(95) = 1.45, p = .15. In the British group, 37 
participants (61.7%) reported living through or witnessing 1-2 traumatic events and 23 
participants (38.3%) reported 3-7 traumatic events. Twenty six participants (43.3%) met the 
DSM-IV screening criteria for PTSD (Foa et al., 1997), 41 participants’ (75.9%) symptoms 
were in the mild-moderate range and 13 participants (21.7%) were in the moderate-severe to 
severe range. The PDS scoring guidelines (Foa et al., 1997) were also used to report on the 
Soviet group scores, however, they have not yet been empirically validated in Soviet 
respondents (E. Gilboa-Shechtman, personal communication, May 4, 2011). In the Soviet 
group, 19 participants (54%) reported living through or witnessing 1-2 traumatic events and 17 
participants (46%) reported 3-7 traumatic events. Fourteen participants (37.8%) met the DSM-
IV screening criteria for PTSD. As for overall severity scores, 27 participants’ (77.1%) scores 
were within the mild-moderate symptom range and eight participants’ (21.6%) scores were 
within the moderately-severe to severe PTSD symptom range.  
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Participants’ most bothersome traumas were grouped in four categories: ‘Calamity’ 
included five event types (accident, disaster, combat, imprisonment and torture); ‘Assault’ 
included five event types (sexual/ non-sexual assault by family member or someone you know, 
sexual/non-sexual assault by a stranger, and sexual contact when you were younger than 18 
with someone who was 5 or more years older); ‘Illness’ included the life threatening illness 
event; and ‘other’ included all other events. Chi-square tests showed that there was a 
significant association between group and the most bothersome traumatic event, χ² (3, N = 96) 
= 11.68, p < .01. The most bothersome traumatic event category in the Soviet group was 
‘calamity’, versus ‘illness’ in the British group. 
3.3 Research Questions 
3.3.1 Research question 1: Cultural differences in self-consistency.  
The first research question examined whether British participants have higher self-
consistency levels compared with Soviets. Unlike previous descriptions of cultural differences 
in self-consistency (Suh, 2002), there were no significant cultural differences in self-
consistency levels, t(94)= -1.17, p = .12, d = -.25 (one-tailed). 
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3.3.2 Research question 2: Cultural differences in trauma-centred identity.  
Table 4 
Cultural Differences (Mann-Whitney tests) and Effect Size Estimates in Trauma-Centred 
Identity  
 
British 
Median 
Score 
Soviet 
Median 
Score 
Mann-Whitney 
U 
p (two-tailed) Effect 
Size 
Estimate 
CES 78  61 631.5* .001 -.35 
SDM .40 .20 775.00* .02 -.25 
Trauma-themed TST 0  0 1790.70 .81 -.02 
Note. CES stands for the Centrality of Events Scale; SDM stands for self-defining memories; 
TST stands for the Twenty Statements Test. 
*significant at p < 0.017 (bonferroni correction) 
The second research question concerned differences among the two cultural groups in 
the extent to which identity is trauma-centred. As seen in Table 4, there were significant 
cultural differences in trauma centrality to identity as measured by the CES and SDM. Identity 
was more trauma-centred in the British group than in the Soviet group.  
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3.3.3 Research question 3: Posttraumatic symptoms and trauma-centred identity.  
Table 5  
Bivariate Correlations (Spearman’s rho) between Posttraumatic Symptoms and Trauma- 
Centred Identity 
PDS CES 
 
SDM 
 
Trauma-themed 
TST 
British 0.22* 0.10 0.34** 
Soviet   0.59*** 0.09         0.21 
Note. PDS stands for the Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale; CES stands for 
the Centrality of Events Scale; SDM stands for self-defining memories; 
TST stands for the Twenty Statements Test. 
* significant at p <.05 level (two-tailed) 
** significant at p <.01 level (two-tailed) 
*** significant at p <.001 level (two-tailed) 
 
The third research question sought to examine cultural differences in the relationships 
between posttraumatic symptoms as measured with the total PDS symptom score and each of 
the trauma-identity measures. As seen in Table 5, a higher degree of trauma-centred identity as 
indicated by CES scores in both cultures and by trauma-themed TST scores in the British 
group was found to be significantly correlated with higher levels of posttraumatic symptoms. 
Additionally, these correlations were converted to z-scores (Fisher transformation) to enable 
comparison of the two groups. The correlation between posttraumatic symptoms and trauma-
centred identity as measured with the CES was significantly higher in Soviets than British,   
Z= 2.09, p < .05. There were no significant differences between the two groups with regards to 
the SDM and TST correlations (p > .05).  
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3.3.4 Research question 4: Posttraumatic symptoms and self-consistency. 
A correlation (Pearson’s r) was computed to examine the relationship between 
posttraumatic symptoms and self-consistency in each culture. In Soviets, posttraumatic 
symptoms were significantly correlated with self-consistency, r(34) = -.41, p < .05. In British, 
the relationship between posttraumatic symptoms and self-consistency was approaching 
significance, r(58) = -.25, p = .06. Higher levels of self-consistency are therefore associated 
with fewer posttraumatic symptoms in Soviets, but not so in British. Z-scores (Fisher 
transformation) showed that these correlation coefficients were not significantly different      
(p > .05). 
3.3.5 Research question 5: Trauma-centred identity and self-consistency.  
Table 6 
Bivariate Correlations (Spearman’s rho) between Trauma-Centred Identity and Self-
Consistency 
SCI CES SDM Trauma-Themed 
TST 
British  -.35** -.03 -.19 
Soviet -.40*  -.10 -.02 
Note. SCI stands for the Self-consistency Index; CES stands for the 
Centrality of Events Scale; SDM stands for self-defining memories; TST 
stands for the Twenty Statements Test. 
* significant at p <.05 level  
** significant at p <.01 level  
 
Correlation analyses (Spearman’s rho) were conducted to examine the relationships 
between self-consistency and the three trauma-identity measures in each group. Trauma-
centred identity as measured with the CES significantly correlated with self-consistency in 
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British and Soviets; higher self-consistency levels are associated with lower levels of trauma-
centeredness in both cultures. This relationship was not significant with the SDM and trauma-
themed TST scores. Z-scores (Fisher transformation) showed that there were no significant 
differences in the correlation coefficients (p > .05). 
3.3.6 Exploratory analyses. 
As gathered from the literature review in section 1.4.1 of the introduction, there is 
evidence that trauma-centred identity predicts PTSD (e.g., Schuettler & Boals, 2011). 
Theoretical PTSD models, however, propose a more complex and indirect pathway from 
trauma-identity to PTSD. In this pathway, self-consistency levels are regarded as influential on 
whether trauma-themed changes to the self eventually result with posttraumatic symptoms 
(Berntsen & Rubin, 2006a; Conway, 2005; Jobson, 2009). That is, self-consistency is 
hypothesised to have a mediating role amidst the progression from trauma-identity to PTSD.  
Given the correlations between trauma-centred identity and posttraumatic symptoms, 
and between trauma-centred identity and self-consistency, exploratory analyses sought to 
examine whether self-consistency mediated the relationship between trauma-centred identity 
and posttraumatic symptoms. Nonparametric bootstrapping analyses (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) 
were used to explore a meditational model of self-consistency as a mediator of the relationship 
between posttraumatic symptoms and trauma-centred identity. The model was initially 
examined with the entire sample. Based on 5000 bootstrapped samples, the findings showed 
that the total effect of trauma-centred identity on posttraumatic symptoms was significant 
(TE=.46, SE=.12, p <.001). The direct effect of trauma-centred identity on posttraumatic 
symptoms was also significant (DE=.38, SE=.12, p<.01). The relationship between trauma-
centred identity and posttraumatic symptoms was mediated by levels of self-consistency 
  
79 
 
(lower 95% CI=.01, upper 95% CI=.20). As zero is not within the 95% confidence interval, the 
indirect effect is significantly different from zero at p < .05 (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Preacher 
et al., 2007). These findings suggest that self-consistency mediates the relationship between 
trauma-centred identity and PTSD symptoms. When the analyses were repeated separately for 
each cultural group, self-consistency did not significantly mediate the relationship between 
trauma-centred identity and posttraumatic symptoms in the Soviet (lower 95% CI=-.05, upper 
95% CI=.53) and British (lower 95% CI=-.03, upper 95% CI=.30) groups.   
A second exploratory analysis was undertaken to compare levels of self-consistency 
pertaining to trauma-related and non-trauma related traits. The analysis repeated the 
methodology described in section 3.1.4 for computing individual SCIs, but each participant’s 
16 x 4 matrix was converted into two separate indices: trauma-related and non-trauma-related 
characteristics. The trauma-related index had the four adjectives from Ehlers and Clark’s 
(2000) cognitive model of PTSD (defeated, influential, secure and victim) across the four 
interpersonal contexts, and the non-trauma index had the remaining 12 adjectives across the 
four interpersonal contexts. Paired t-tests were then carried separately for each group. Both 
Soviet and British participants exhibited significantly higher levels of self-consistency with 
regards to the trauma-related personal characteristics. The Soviet sample had significantly 
greater levels of self-consistency for trauma-related traits (M = 81.22, SE = 2.27) compared 
with non-trauma-related traits (M = 60.09, SE = 2.13), t(36)= -7.25, p < .001, d = .77, and the 
British sample similarly exhibited significantly greater levels of self-consistency for trauma-
related traits (M = 78.62, SE = 1.97) compared with non-trauma-related traits (M = 65.82,   
SE= 1.90), t(59)= -5.55, p < .001, d = .59. Levels of self-consistency for trauma-related traits 
were not significantly correlated with posttraumatic symptoms in the Soviet, r(34) = -.08,        
  
80 
 
p = .65, and in the British, r(58) = -.04, p = .78, samples. These exploratory analyses suggest a 
difference in the perception of personal traits which have been theoretically and empirically 
related to the experience of trauma. Specifically, individuals appear to have a significantly 
more consistent perception of themselves across different interpersonal situations when they 
consider trauma-related aspects of their selves, compared with non-trauma self aspects which 
are perceived significantly less consistently. The analyses also show that the tendency for 
perceiving trauma-related traits more consistently is a characteristic of both British and 
Soviets.  
 3.4 Summary of the Results 
The analyses tested the five research questions and found the following results. The 
two cultural groups did not differ significantly regarding levels of self-consistency. The British 
group had significantly higher levels of trauma-centred identity than the Soviet group. 
Trauma-centred identity was significantly positively correlated with posttraumatic symptoms 
in both groups, and this correlation was significantly stronger in the Soviets. In Soviets, those 
with higher self-consistency levels had significantly fewer posttraumatic symptoms. In both 
groups, higher levels of self-consistency were significantly associated with lower levels of 
trauma-centred identity. Additional exploratory analyses found that self-consistency mediated 
the relationship between trauma-centred identity and posttraumatic symptoms when the sample 
was examined as whole. Self-consistency levels of trauma-related traits were significantly 
higher than those of non-trauma-related traits in both groups.  
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4 Discussion 
4.1 Overview 
PTSD is an anxiety disorder that can develop following traumatic experiences. 
Lifetime exposure to trauma is high (e.g., 80.7%; de Vries & Olff, 2009) and a significant 
proportion of survivors across ethnicities and cultures are affected by PTSD (Foa et al., 2009). 
Empirically-supported theoretical models describe the personal and situational variables 
involved in the development and maintenance of PTSD. Many of these models emphasize the 
role of the self and the potential impact of trauma on survivors’ identity (i.e., fragmented, 
altered; Brewin, 2011). Research has found that increased levels of trauma- centred identity 
(i.e., the perception of the trauma as a predominant and self-defining event in one’s life story) 
predict the development of PTSD symptoms (e.g., Berntsen & Rubin, 2007). An important 
caveat of these findings, however, is that they are based almost exclusively on participants 
from individualistic cultures. Consequently, a recurrent criticism had been querying the 
suitability of the current explanatory PTSD models to people from collectivistic, non-Western 
cultures (e.g., Foa et al., 2009).  
The concept of identity consistency, or self-consistency, has received increased 
attention in the field of social psychology. Psychological theories and research largely 
associate self-consistency with well-being (e.g., Donahue et al., 1993). Cross-cultural research 
has provided evidence for cultural differences in levels of self-consistency; high levels of self-
consistency are perceived as desirable in individualistic cultures but as immature and rigid in 
collectivistic ones (Suh, 2002). Based on these findings, the Threat to the Conceptual Self 
model (TCS; Jobson, 2009) has proposed a broadening of current PTSD models to include 
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collectivistic cultures. TCS predicts that the culturally-appropriate perception of self-
consistency will influence the relationship between survivors’ memory of the trauma, the 
memory’s impact on the self, and the development of PTSD. The relationships between PTSD, 
trauma-centred identity and self-consistency have only been empirically examined in a 
Western, student sample (Webb & Jobson, 2011). Thus, this thesis sought to explore the 
relationships between posttraumatic symptoms, trauma-centred identity and self-consistency in 
individualistic and collectivistic cultures. For the purpose of this investigation, community 
participants from British and Soviet cultures (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2004) were recruited and 
compared. 
The present chapter begins with an account of the study findings in relation to the 
research questions asked in section 1.8 of the introduction. Second, the strengths and 
limitations of this work are considered with regards to the study design, participants, measures, 
procedure and data analysis. Third, the theoretical and clinical implications of the results are 
discussed. Fourth, directions for future research are proposed. The chapter ends with a 
conclusion of the main findings.   
4.2 Summary of the Findings with relation to the Study Questions  
4.2.1 Research question 1 
Research in social psychology has identified lower levels of self-consistency in 
collectivistic cultures compared with individualistic ones. The former group has typically been 
represented by members of Asian cultures (e.g., Koreans; Suh, 2002). Therefore, the first 
research question aimed to explore whether Soviets would also demonstrate lower levels of 
self-consistency when compared with British. 
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British and Soviets were not significantly different in their levels of self-consistency. 
This finding is distinctive when compared with the existing cross-cultural literature on self-
consistency. In addition, the former Soviet Union was previously described as collectivistic 
(e.g., Tower et al., 1997), and yet participants in the Soviet group were not significantly 
different to British participants in levels of cultural independence/ interdependence. Therefore, 
the Soviet participants in the present sample appear to be as individualistic, and as self-
consistent, as the British sample. How may the lack of group differences in the cultural 
dimension be explained? For the Soviet participants, having similar levels of individualism, 
and self-consistency, as the British participants, is perhaps indicative of cultural changes in 
former USSR states. Possibly, a greater exposure to the Western culture following the 1991 
breakdown of the Soviet Union had initiated a shift towards individualism, although it may 
have been too premature for studies from the 1990s (e.g. Tower et al., 1997) to capture such 
cultural changes. Alternatively, the Soviet participants’ levels of individualism and self-
consistency may be unique to those who had immigrated away from the home countries, 
reflecting the new and different cultural experiences as a result of participants’ move to 
England. It is also potential that participants’ individualism and self-consistency scores were 
influenced by the mode of assessment of self-consistency and cultural 
independence/interdependence. Future research should examine whether these findings are 
unique to Soviets who live in England.   
4.2.2 Research question 2 
Previous research has explored the centrality of trauma to identity in British (e.g., 
Webb & Jobson, 2011) and other individualistic and collectivistic cultures (e.g., Australian, 
Asian; Jobson & O’Kearney, 2006; 2008). The former Soviet Union has been recognized as a 
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collectivistic culture (e.g., Tower et al., 1997), but to date, trauma-centred identity has never 
been examined in this group. Thus the second research question sought to examine differences 
between British and Soviet participants in levels of trauma-centred identity.  
British participants had significantly higher levels of trauma-centred identity than 
Soviet participants. This difference manifested in two of the three identity measures, namely 
the Centrality of Events Scale (CES) and self-defining memories (SDM). The present analyses 
also showed that the two cultural groups were not significantly different in levels of cultural 
independence/ interdependence. Therefore, despite a similar tendency towards autonomy and 
self-definition that is derived from internal traits in the two groups, the British participants 
were significantly more prone to regard previous traumatic experiences as turning points 
central to their identity. These results are unlike Jobson and O’Kearney’s (2006), whose 
Australian and Asian participants were not significantly different in their levels of trauma-
centred SDM ratios. However, these results may not be comparable given that Jobson and 
O’Kearney’s (2006) findings relied on SDM only, whereas the present results indicated group 
differences in trauma-centred identity in both the CES and SDM. 
The findings from the second research question showed that the British sample 
displayed a meaningfully higher degree of trauma-centeredness, and there may be several 
reasons for why that is. Two possible explanations involve the CES. The CES was constructed 
and trialled in independent cultures (e.g., North Americans, Danish) and therefore it may be 
better suited to assess trauma-identity in independent populations. There is also evidence for 
cultural differences in responses to Likert scales (Lee , Jones  Mineyama, & Zhang, 2002), 
although this alone is unlikely to explain the present finding as there were no group differences 
in the other Likert scales: the Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS; Foa et al., 1997) and the 
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Hopkins Symptom Checklist (HSCL-25; Derogatis et al., 1974). Additional research is 
required to investigate whether higher levels of trauma-centred identity are associated, at least 
in part, with the mode of identity assessment, or whether high trauma-identity levels are a 
unique characteristic of the British culture.  
The process of anchoring one’s identity round the trauma may also be influenced by 
the type of trauma experienced. In the present study, the two cultural groups experienced 
similar rates of trauma exposure but they differed in terms of the most bothersome trauma. 
British participants were most distressed by experiences of life threatening illness. Soviet 
participants were most affected by events in the “calamity” category, which grouped together 
accidents, disasters, combat, imprisonment and torture. None of the participants reportedly 
experienced the three latter traumas. Therefore, Soviets were most distressed by experiences of 
accidents or disasters, and British were most bothered by illness. This difference may partially 
explain the greater levels of trauma-centred identity evidenced in the British group. While 
accidents and disasters are often isolated, short-lasting incidents, life threatening illnesses may 
be prolonged and chronic. As such, it is possible that traumas which are more continuous in 
nature, such as prolonged illnesses, are more likely to become a core component of one’s 
identity, compared with a briefer trauma such as a car accident. With some similarity, there is 
evidence that the duration of the trauma is positively associated with mental defeat in victims 
of rape (Ehlers, Clark, Dunmore, Jaycox, Meadows, & Foa, 1998). Further research is needed 
to examine whether the type and duration of the traumatic event is associated with its eventual 
centrality to identity.   
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4.2.3 Research question 3 
Trauma-centred identity has been found to correlate with, and predict, posttraumatic 
symptoms, in clinical and non-clinical samples from Western cultures, as reviewed in section 
1.4.1 of the introduction. Jobson and O’Kearney (2006) reported that posttraumatic symptoms 
were associated with trauma-centred identity in members of individualistic, but not 
collectivistic, cultures. The relationships between trauma-centred identity and posttraumatic 
symptoms in British and Soviets were therefore the subject of the third research question. 
Trauma-centeredness as indicated by scores on the CES was significantly associated 
with PTSD symptoms in both cultures. This relationship was also indicated in the British 
group when trauma-centred identity was measured using the trauma-themed Twenty-
Statements Test (TST; Kuhn & MacPartland, 1954). The association between posttraumatic 
symptoms and trauma-centred identity was significantly stronger in the Soviet group. 
Compared with previous research, these findings are unique. While the correlation in the 
British sample is in line with earlier studies, the positive association between posttraumatic 
symptoms and trauma-centred identity in the Soviet sample is dissimilar to the existing data 
about collectivistic cultures. This finding suggests that the present Soviet sample is different to 
other collectivistic groups, in its levels of cultural independence and self-consistency as 
discussed before, and also in the relationship between trauma-centred identity and PTSD 
symptoms.   
4.2.4 Research question 4 
Theoretical models of PTSD (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; 
Jobson, 2009; Rubin et al., 2008) attribute a causal role to self-consistency in the development 
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of PTSD. Evidence for cultural differences in self-consistency (Suh, 2002) was incorporated 
into the TCS model (Jobson, 2009), to postulate cultural differences in the relationship 
between self-consistency and posttraumatic symptoms. This relationship had been explored in 
British participants. When the effects of depression were statistically removed, self-
consistency was found to be directly related to intrusive posttraumatic symptoms (Webb & 
Jobson, 2011). In the present study, the fourth research question explored the relationship 
between self-consistency and posttraumatic symptoms cross-culturally.  
Self-consistency levels were negatively correlated with posttraumatic symptoms in the 
Soviet group. A negative relationship was approaching significance in the British group         
(p = .06). Concerning individualistic cultures, the results are unlike Webb and Jobson’s (2011), 
although the present analyses pertain to posttraumatic symptoms as a whole, and the effects of 
depression had not been removed as Miller and Chapman (2001) suggest not controlling for 
depression. As for the Soviet sample, the relationship between self-consistency and PTSD 
symptoms has never before been explored in this culture, and therefore the findings cannot be 
compared with previous ones. The results of the fourth research question suggest that, as with 
the relationship between trauma-centred identity and PTSD, Soviet and British participants 
were also similar in terms of the direction of the relationship between self-consistency and 
PTSD symptoms. 
4.2.5 Research question 5 
PTSD models propose a link between levels of self-consistency and trauma-centred 
identity (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Jobson, 2009; Rubin et al., 
2008). The TCS model (Jobson, 2009) predicts that in trauma survivors from individualistic 
cultures, who typically value high levels of self-consistency, trauma memories may lead to 
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trauma-centred identity; in trauma survivors from collectivistic cultures, who typically prefer a 
more flexible self, trauma memories are hypothesised to have a lesser influence on survivors’ 
identity (Jobson, 2009). In the single investigation of these predictions prior to this study, 
levels of self-consistency were not significantly associated with trauma-centred identity in 
British students (Webb & Jobson, 2011). Therefore, the fifth research question aimed to 
evaluate whether self-consistency is associated with trauma-centred identity in British and 
Soviet participants. 
In both cultural groups, levels of self-consistency were significantly negatively 
correlated with trauma-centred identity: the higher the self-consistency the lower the levels of 
trauma-centred identity. The meaningful association between higher levels of self-consistency 
and lower levels of trauma-centred identity in British differs from Webb and Jobson’s (2011) 
findings in this culture. The results of the fifth research question show that, as with the 
relationships explored in the third and fourth questions, British and Soviet participants were 
also similar in the negative association between self-consistency and trauma-centred identity. 
4.2.6 Exploratory analyses 
 Following from the positive correlation between trauma-centred identity and 
posttraumatic symptoms identified by the third research question, and the negative correlation 
between trauma-centred identity and self-consistency shown in the fifth research question, 
exploratory analyses were carried out to identify whether self-consistency mediates the 
relationship between trauma-centred identity and posttraumatic symptoms. As there were no 
significant group differences in the levels of self-consistency, and given the significant and 
positive relationships between trauma-centred identity and posttraumatic symptoms in both 
groups, British and Soviet participants were examined together.  
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The results of the mediation analyses showed that self-consistency mediated the 
relationship between trauma-centred identity and posttraumatic symptoms when the sample 
was examined as a whole. The mediation model suggests that those with lower levels of 
trauma-centred identity are likely to be more self-consistent, and through higher self-
consistency levels, they are less likely to experience posttraumatic symptoms. While previous 
studies showed that trauma-centred identity is a strong predictor of PTSD symptoms (e.g., 
Berntsen & Rubin, 2006b), the present results suggest that the relationship between these two 
variables might be more complex. That is, it appears that trauma-centred identity leads to 
posttraumatic symptoms via levels of self-consistency. The mediating role of self-consistency 
must be explored further, to understand whether it leads to posttraumatic symptoms or perhaps 
maintains them as well.   
The findings from the second exploratory analysis suggest increased consistency with 
regards to trauma-related aspects of the self. This consistency bias of trauma-related traits 
existed in both the Soviet and British participants.  
4.3 Strengths and Limitations of the Study 
 The strengths and limitations of the present study, and their meaning for the 
interpretation of the findings, will now be discussed. 
4.3.1 Design. 
 The cross-sectional between-group design using an individualistic cultural group and a 
collectivistic cultural group was deemed appropriate for exploring the research questions. The 
recruitment method aimed to reach various sectors of the local British and Soviet communities 
living in the UK, so that the sample adequately represented these two groups. However, the 
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lack of random sampling is a weakness because those who chose to participate were perhaps 
different to those who did not, which may limit the external validity of the findings.  
Group comparisons revealed that British and Soviet participants were successfully 
matched on age, gender, self-rated study difficulty, depression symptoms, posttraumatic 
symptoms and number of traumas. The groups were dissimilar in the most bothersome 
traumatic event category, which had been ‘calamity’ in the Soviet group and ‘illness’ in the 
British group. As discussed in section 4.2.1, this difference in the most bothersome trauma 
may have contributed in part to the observed cultural differences in trauma-centred identity. In 
addition, the study groups were perhaps different on factors not accounted for (e.g., 
socioeconomic level). Collating additional demographic information may have resolved this.   
4.3.2 Participants. 
Non-clinical community samples were chosen for several reasons. First, the resources 
required for recruiting two clinical samples matched on variables such as age and gender were 
beyond the resources available for this study. Second, and as demonstrated in the literature 
review, there is good evidence for the association between posttraumatic symptoms and 
trauma-centred identity in non-clinical samples (e.g., Berntsen & Rubin, 2006b). A 
relationship between posttraumatic symptoms and self-consistency has also been found in 
individuals without PTSD (i.e., in a non-clinical sample of university students; Webb & 
Jobson, 2011). As described above, participants in the two study samples were similar in age, 
gender, self-rated study difficulty, depression and posttraumatic symptoms, and number of 
traumas. This increased the likelihood of identifying significant differences between the 
groups.  
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Participants in the Soviet sample were individuals from former Soviet Union countries 
currently residing in the UK. They may have been different in terms of the study variables 
from their counterparts who live in the home countries. With that in mind, the present data 
were analysed with the length of time participants had been living in the UK as covariate, and 
results were equivalent, suggesting that time in the UK alone did not account for the findings. 
Yet, the fact that these participants had made the decision to immigrate to the UK suggests that 
they possess a considerable sense of autonomy, and perhaps an attraction to the British culture 
which is more Western and individualistic compared with former Soviet Union cultures. 
Marian and Kaushanskaya (2004) discuss differences in self-construal in members of cultural 
groups that have been socialized in different cultures. In the present study, the Soviet 
participants’ experiences of immigration and immersion in a Western culture had possibly 
influenced their levels of cultural individualism/ collectivism and self-consistency, compared 
with Soviets who had not immigrated. While the variables associated with the decision to 
immigrate and its consequences had not been the subject of this study, it is important to 
consider their potential role in the observed similarities in group levels of cultural 
individualism/ collectivism and self-consistency.  
The Soviet participants’ similarity to the British in cultural individualism/ collectivism 
is notable, as it possibly provides new and updated knowledge about the Soviet population 
living in the UK, and perhaps elsewhere too, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. As 
mentioned before, no published studies so far have tested the present variables in a Soviet 
sample, and this is therefore a strength of this study. Further strengths were the fairly 
homogeneous sample in which 33 of the 37 Soviet participants were from Russia, and 
corresponding with this, the provision of the study measures in Russian. 
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An initial power calculation to estimate sample size with α-level of .05, power of .80 
and a medium effect size (.3) yielded a desired sample size of 64 participants per group. A 
total of 103 individuals completed the study and after the exclusion of six non-trauma 
survivors, there were 60 British participants and 37 Soviet participants. The smaller than 
planned sample size, particularly in the Soviet group, resulted from difficulties to recruit. 
Despite the rise in Soviet migration to Norfolk (Bishop, 2010), it remains a relatively small 
group compared with the local British population. The study recruitment benefitted from the 
aid of key Soviet community members, and still, fewer individuals than expected had decided 
to participate.  
4.3.3 Measures. 
The study employed a range of valid and reliable measures in line with previous 
research on trauma-centred identity and self-consistency. The SCI, TST (Kuhn & 
MacPartland, 1954), PDS (Foa et al., 1997) and HSCL-25 (Derogatis et al., 1974) have been 
used cross-culturally, which therefore supports their inclusion in the present study.  
An important strength of this study was the use of three identity measures. These were 
the CES, a self-rated Likert scale, and the SDM and TST, both open-response measures. The 
CES had been used extensively to estimate trauma centrality, and the open-response format of 
the SDM and TST enabled participants to provide information more freely. The inclusion of 
three trauma-identity measures aimed to enable a thorough understanding of this concept and 
its relationships with the remaining study variables. It also extended previous work which had 
only used the CES (Webb & Jobson, 2011), or that which relied on open-response measures 
(Jobson & O’Kearney, 2006; 2008). A variety of identity measures was also desirable given 
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that the relationship between trauma-centred identity and self-consistency had never before 
been explored cross-culturally. 
The analyses of the three identity measures indicated that they were not significantly 
related to one another, other than SDM and TST in the Soviet sample. This finding is of 
interest as it suggests variations in the way each measure captures trauma-centeredness. In the 
only other study which employed both the TST and SDM, by Jobson and O’Kearney (2008), 
correlations among these measures were not reported on; hence, the correlations, or lack of 
them, between the identity measures in this study, are novel. As the aim of the three identity 
measures was to assess the same construct, they were expected to relate with one another, and 
this was only the case with the SDM and TST in the Soviet group. These surprising findings 
may be explained by the following. First, the mean scores for both groups on the TST and 
SDM neared the second and third deciles - seemingly low scores given the possible response 
range. This appears to differ from the mean scores on the CES which were within the fifth and 
eighth deciles. Therefore the low scores on the SDM and TST may represent floor effects. This 
may indicate the inferiority of the SDM and TST in research with community samples. A 
second possible explanation for the observed differences involves the autobiographical 
memory and its functioning post trauma. Autobiographical memory, defined as memory for 
one’s life events (Conway & Rubin, 1993), functions to sustain a coherent sense of self over 
time (Barclay, 1996). Empirical evidence shows that autobiographical memory may be 
distorted to support the self and its goals (Barclay & Wellman, 1986; Conway, 2005; Neisser, 
1981). Possibly, the goal of maintaining psychological health served to avert the present 
participants’ memories away from their past traumas, and promoted a free recall of non-trauma 
memories and self definitions in the SDM and TST. Differently, the CES asks about trauma 
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directly, and is therefore more likely to compel respondents to attend to their traumatic 
experiences and their impact on identity at present. Third, and as discussed in Jobson and 
O’Kearney (2008), all three identity measures are perhaps limited in assessing exact levels of 
trauma-centeredness, as oppose to the extent to which participants wish to disclose, and their 
possible bias towards socially or culturally- desired responses.   
Given that the identity measures were mostly not correlated, the nature of the 
relationships between trauma-centred identity and the other study variables depended on the 
identity measure used for analyses. It would have been a limitation had the study relied on a 
single assessment of trauma-identity. Rather, the different results obtained by the three identity 
scales may be used to infer on the measurement of trauma-centred identity. Specifically, 
seeing that the CES was more often meaningfully associated with PTSD and with self-
consistency, it is possible that self-rated scales of trauma-centred identity are more appropriate 
for empirical research than open-response measures. Further, given the wealth of empirical 
evidence for the relationship between PTSD and trauma-centred identity, the non-significant 
associations between PTSD and SDM in both groups, and PTSD and TST in the Soviet 
sample, were unexpected; again, these findings may indicate the inferiority of open-response 
measures, compared to Likert scales, for research in this area.  
The TST had been used in a 10-statement rather than 20-statement version. This was 
done primarily to reduce participation fatigue, as previous studies found that participants 
discontinued after seven statements (Bochner, 1976; Bochner & Perks, 1971). The vast 
majority of participants provided no less than 10 statements. Yet a possible limitation is that 
the shortened version may have been less sensitive for identifying differences in trauma-
centred identity. As the TST was also used to assess levels of cultural individualism/ 
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collectivism, the use of 10 rather than 20 responses may have hindered the detection of group 
differences, hence the similarity between the two cultures on this variable. The inclusion of a 
second measure of individualism/ collectivism alongside the TST may have resolved this 
uncertainty. For instance, Hui’s 63-item Likert scale, the INDCOL, which captured differences 
between British and Russian participants in Tower et al’s (1997) study.   
The choice of 16 traits for the SCI, compared with a higher number of traits used in 
previous research, also aimed to reduce fatigue in participants. As in previous studies that used 
more traits, the results of the SCI were normally distributed, supporting its use in this version. 
Another strength was the incorporation of trauma-related traits from Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) 
cognitive model of PTSD in the current version of the SCI. This addition enabled the 
exploratory examination of self-consistency levels in trauma-related versus non-trauma-related 
traits, which indicated increased self-consistency regarding the former. Yet the process of 
choosing the four trauma-related traits was solely guided by theory (i.e., Ehlers and Clark’s 
four cognitive appraisal domains: mental defeat, control, alienation and permanent change), 
and therefore, the validity of the selected 16 adjectives as pertaining to trauma or not, could 
have been tested prior to their use in this study, for instance by obtaining valence ratings from 
British and Soviet individuals.  
Several strengths and limitations are associated with the use of the study measures in 
the Soviet group. The CES had been used extensively in studies within this field, as discussed 
in section 1.4.1.2 of the introduction, but only with Western cultures. This was the first study 
to expand the use of the CES beyond non-Western populations, and this is therefore a strength. 
An additional strength pertaining to the Soviet group had been the use of Russian-translated 
study measures. The study measures required good reading comprehension as well as the 
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provision of written memories and self-statements. Therefore, completing the study in Russian 
aimed to reduce the extraneous impact of language. Russian was chosen because it was the 
official language of the former Soviet Union countries during the Communist rule, and thus it 
was expected that Russian participants as well as participants from other former Soviet Union 
countries would have a good command of it. Indeed, all the participants in the Soviet group 
completed the study in Russian. While it is possible that some of those who initially expressed 
an interest in participating chose not to do so because they had difficulties with the Russian 
measures, the researcher had not been contacted concerning this matter and so it is unlikely to 
have been a common problem. In addition, translating the study measures to other Soviet 
languages would have been beyond the resources available for this work.  
The six study measures and the demographic information section were provided in 
Russian. The HSCL-25 and PDS had been translated to Russian and used in previous research 
(E. Gilboa-Shechtman, personal communication, May 4, 2011; Hoffmann et al., 2006). The 
process of translating the SCI, SDM, TST and CES was described at length in section 2.3.1. 
The translation process followed current guidance (Beaton et al., 2000). There was also good 
internal consistency in the Soviet participants’ PDS and CES scores. At the same time, it 
would have been preferable to test the content validity of the translations prior to their present 
use. Ultimately, given that the use of the SCI, SDM, TST and CES with a Soviet sample has 
never before been reported, this study offers a unique contribution to the current literature. 
Further studies are required to confirm the validity of these measures in individuals from 
culturally-collectivistic cultures. Additionally, while inter-rater reliability was high, the study 
could have benefitted from the inclusion of independent raters to assess whether participants’ 
transcripts were identifiable as British or Soviet. 
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4.3.4 Procedure.  
It was a strength of the study to replicate Suh’s (2002) procedure for the assessment of 
self-consistency given its previous use in non-clinical, individualistic and collectivistic 
cultures. Repeating this procedure increased confidence in the validity and reliability of the 
current findings. Further, participants in both groups chose either the paper or the online 
versions of the study. Both these forms of participation were free of the presence of a 
researcher, which reduced demand characteristics.  
4.3.5 Data analysis. 
Statistical transformations were unable to overcome the non-normal distributions of the 
CES, SDM and TST. Consequently, analyses that involved trauma-centred identity or cultural 
individualism/collectivism used non-parametric statistics. This is a limitation because non-
parametric analyses reduce the power to accurately detect significant effects by increasing the 
likelihood of Type II errors. Concerning the exploratory mediation analyses, the use of 
bootstrapping has several advantages. Bootstrapping is considered preferable to other 
mediation methods as it does not make assumptions about the normality of the data. 
Bootstrapping has also been recommended to use with smaller samples than those needed to 
meet the distributional assumptions of other methods (Preacher & Hayes, 2004).   
4.4 Theoretical Implications  
The main finding of this study is that high levels of identity consistency may be 
protective against trauma-centred identity and PTSD in survivors of trauma from British and 
Soviet cultures, although the relationship between self-consistency and PTSD in the British 
sample had only approached significance. These findings support and extend the existing 
evidence on the advantageous role of identity consistency in maintaining well-being (e.g., 
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depression and anxiety; Donahue et al., 1993) to include PTSD. They also demonstrate that 
higher levels of self-consistency are valuable in Western cultures as well as for individuals 
from the former USSR.  
The benefits of self-consistency, as seen in the present study, are meaningful for the 
Self-Memory System model (SMS; Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) and for 
the mnemonic model (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006a). According to the SMS, the working self 
aims to avoid challenges or threats to its ongoing sense of self coherence. In the face of 
trauma, one strives to maintain or regain coherence between the trauma memory and current 
self-perceptions. The mnemonic model emphasizes the merging of the trauma in a consistent 
life story. Both models privilege identity consistency in the psychological adjustment 
following trauma. Yet neither model offers an explicit account of the relationship between 
coherence needs and trauma-centred identity. Additionally, the SMS does not detail under 
which conditions do changes to the trauma memory, initially in the service of coherence needs, 
result with a trauma-themed identity and PTSD. The current findings show that individuals 
with high levels of self-consistency are less likely to anchor their identity around the traumatic 
event, or to suffer posttraumatic symptoms. Possibly, a highly consistent identity may act as a 
resilience factor that preserves one’s former sense of self despite the experience of trauma. A 
self perception that is stable and consistent across roles and contexts may therefore be 
advantageous in framing the trauma (and its effects) as a discrete, unusual entity, too dissimilar 
to become immersed with one’s identity. The protective effect of self-consistency against 
PTSD lends support to the SMS and mnemonic models. For the SMS, it is meaningful in 
understanding the interplay between correspondence and coherence needs. It appears that, 
despite the evolutionary need to accurately capture events (correspondence), it is perhaps more 
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beneficiary in the aftermath of trauma to maintain current goals and self definitions 
(coherence). SMS postulates that an ongoing experience of incoherence may cause identity 
changes to emphasize how the self has changed following trauma. The current results highlight 
the vulnerability associated with low levels of self-consistency, but they also suggest that 
increased identity consistency is associated with fewer posttraumatic symptoms and with a 
reduced tendency to perceive the self as changed post trauma. The SMS proposes that 
increasing one’s sense of coherence is desirable, and this has been supported in this study. As 
for the mnemonic model, the present outcomes suggest that self-consistency needs are related 
to the role of the trauma in survivors’ identity. This relationship is perhaps more meaningful 
than the accessibility of the trauma memory; self-consistency may be protective even when the 
trauma is seen as a life turning point.  
Among the existing theoretical models of PTSD, the TCS (Jobson, 2009) provides the 
most detailed account of the role of self-consistency. The TCS hypothesises that individuals 
possess both independent/interdependent orientations in their self/ identity, and cultural norms 
determine and maintain the dominance of one orientation. For those who value independence, 
such as the British and Soviet participants in this study, the independent orientation dominates 
the self. Therefore, individualistic characteristics of everyday goals and memories are 
preferred and pronounced. However, unusual events, such as traumas, can override the 
culturally-dominant orientation. Knowledge that differs from the dominant expectation is 
likely to become well remembered and a “turning point” (Berntsen & Rubin, 2007). The TCS 
hypothesises that trauma survivors from individualistic cultures are at a higher risk for 
developing trauma-centred identities: their perception of the trauma as a life turning point, 
together with their culturally-dictated higher levels of self-consistency, may cause trauma-
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related attributions to be viewed as central identity components (Jobson, 2009). However, the 
present findings contradict this hypothesis, as high levels of self-consistency were associated 
with lower levels of trauma-centred identity, as well as with fewer posttraumatic symptoms. 
Further, the current results suggest that self-consistency mediates the relationship between 
trauma-centred identity and the onset of PTSD. Thus, self-consistency appears to be a 
protective rather than a risk factor for survivors of trauma. 
Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) model emphasises the role of negative self appraisals in 
PTSD. It is supported by evidence that PTSD severity relates to perceived permanent and 
negative changes to one’s character (e.g., Ehlers et al., 2000). There is also evidence for 
posttraumatic changes to identity that are unique to PTSD and differ from negative/ depressive 
self perceptions (Karl et al., 2009). The latter finding concerning self-appraisals specific to 
PTSD received support in the present exploratory analyses. These suggested that trauma-
related self appraisals (defeated, influential, secure and victim) are perceived in a unique way. 
Trauma survivors appear to appraise themselves more consistently when trauma-related traits 
are concerned; they seem to have a more consistent view on the extent to which trauma-related 
traits describe them, compared with non-trauma traits. It seems that self-appraisals and traits 
which are theoretically related to trauma, such as those outlined by Ehlers and Clark (2000) 
and used in this study, are regarded more congruently, and are less likely to depend on the 
social situation or one’s current role. 
Self-consistency levels may determine whether the impact of the trauma on survivors’ 
identity will result in PTSD. Traumatic experiences are often inconsistent with previously-held 
assumptions about oneself and the world, and in the process of attempting to resolve this 
difference the trauma can become salient in one’s mental life and identity (Berntsen & Rubin, 
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2006a; Horowitz 1976; Janoff-Bulman, 1992). The present findings suggest that those with 
increased levels of self-consistency, who naturally strive to maintain a consistent perception of 
themselves across social roles and situations, are more prone to hold onto their pre-trauma 
identity, and maintain it relatively unaffected by the traumatic event. They are also less likely 
to experience posttraumatic symptoms. Individuals with reduced levels of self-consistency, 
who more easily adapt their sense of self to specific contexts and to others’ expectations, seem 
to be more at risk to develop identities that are conceptualised by trauma, and PTSD. Hence, 
high self-consistency levels may operate to obstruct the trauma memory from becoming the 
defining feature of identity, and buffer against PTSD.    
Why is self-consistency protective? The personality literature on self-consistency 
suggests that increased self-consistency is related to self-esteem and confidence (Donahue et 
al., 1993). Suh (2002) showed that self-consistency is predicted by a predisposition of not 
being overly concerned with how one is viewed by other people. Highly consistent persons 
therefore tend to be less influenced, or inhibited, by others’ attitudes and judgements. This idea 
that being less reliant on others’ feedback is psychologically advantageous is further supported 
in the self-esteem literature. For instance, people with high self-esteem are less dependent on 
others for self-verification (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001). As the present findings suggest, highly 
consistent individuals may also be less influenced by external events, even traumatic ones.  
Early theoreticians and more recent research have attempted to understand individual 
differences in levels of self-consistency. There is evidence that the forming of a highly 
consistent, unitary self is not affected by the quantity of roles but rather, how well they are 
integrated with one another (Donahue et al., 1993). A poorly-integrated “divided self” is 
associated with internal experiences of emotional distress (e.g., depression, anxiety, 
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neuroticism), but also, with interpersonal difficulties and negative role-related experiences 
(e.g., lack of self control, non-acceptance of social norms; Donahue et al., 1993, p. 844). The 
development of a divided, non-united self is attributed, at least in part, to social-contextual 
factors. Sullivan (1953) conceptualised the self as composed by perceived reflections of 
others’ views. He described people’s tendency to emphasise those aspects of themselves which 
are approved by meaningful others, and in turn, to suppress the disfavoured ones. Therefore, 
social and environmental demands are hypothesised to influence the types of roles acquired 
and kept. An environment which demands the individual to own and successfully occupy 
conflicting roles (e.g., caring father and fierce soldier) is likely to challenge one’s ability to 
maintain a core, consistent self. James (1892, p.185), in his discussion of developmental 
precursors to the “conflict of the different Me’s”, described a high degree of incompatible 
reflected appraisals by one’s early environment, coupled with a child’s oversensitivity to 
notice and adopt others’ perspectives. That is, a conflicting and demanding early environment 
might lead, at least in part, to a malleable sense of identity, whereby the need to hold 
inconsistent roles comes at the expense of forming a coherent ‘core’ self. This might result 
with an absence of a unitary self to rely on. Following trauma, the self roles stemming from 
the traumatic experience (e.g., victim) can exert a more profound impact on one’s identity.  
The present findings offer preliminary evidence that reduced self-consistency is not 
only a marker of psychopathology in general, but of PTSD in particular. The findings provide 
initial evidence for the relationship between lower levels of self-consistency and a trauma-
centred identity and PTSD. Although based on non-clinical samples, it is suggested that the 
observed relationships whereby those with reduced self-consistency experience greater levels 
of trauma-centred identity and PTSD, occur in the general population, and in at least one other 
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cultural group (Soviets). Consistent with the empirical evidence that lower levels of self-
consistency are related to poor self-esteem and higher depression, anxiety and somatisation 
(Block, 1961; Donahue et al., 1993; Sheldon et al., 1997), it is possible that reduced self-
consistency may act as a risk factor that precipitates or maintains PTSD. 
4.5 Clinical Implications  
 PTSD models discuss the identification and removal of inconsistencies associated with 
the trauma memory or the interpretation of the trauma, in the promotion of psychological 
recovery. Conway (2005) and Ehlers and Clark (2000) emphasize the elaboration of the 
different aspects of the trauma memories, to enable coherence with one another and with pre-
trauma knowledge. Brewin and Holmes (2003) propose to encourage consistency between the 
trauma narrative and one’s pre-trauma identity as a mode for challenging trauma-related, 
negative cognitions. Based on these models and on the present findings, the following section 
outlines possible expansions of evidenced-based cognitive behavioural treatments for PTSD. 
Its key aim is to offer interventions that target trauma-centeredness and promote identity 
consistency, to ultimately reduce symptoms of PTSD.  
The current results suggest that a high degree of self-consistency is protective against 
PTSD. Therefore, clinical interventions that enhance identity consistency could be helpful in 
preventing or reducing posttraumatic symptoms. In line with the theoretical models above, it is 
suggested that PTSD treatments promote consistency among clients’ adaptive roles and 
attributions. Given that the benefits of self-consistency were evident in both British and 
Soviets, the following clinical applications would be relevant to clients from these cultures, 
and possibly, to those from additional cultures too.  
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Imaginal exposure to the trauma memory, real-life exposure to trauma reminders, and 
cognitive restructuring to challenge dysfunctional cognitions, have been recommended in the 
treatment of PTSD (e.g., Resick et al., 2002). Imaginal exposure in the service of increased 
self-consistency could begin by identifying survivors’ trauma-related self components that 
match pre-trauma ones (e.g., components of the trauma memory that are consistent with one’s 
pre-trauma identity: “I have always been a caring and protective parent” and “I did protect my 
son during the attack”). Next, imaginal exposure to the trauma memory may introduce and 
incorporate this new and incompatible information, to form an updated trauma memory which 
includes those pre-trauma perceptions of the self. With repeated exposure, the updated trauma 
memory should gain a retrieval advantage (Brewin et al., 1996), and be easier to integrate 
alongside other autobiographical information. Cognitive restructuring may promote self-
consistency by downplaying or challenging trauma memories that are highly inconsistent with 
the client’s identity. For instance, clients could trace dysfunctional self-attributions (e.g., “I 
will always be vulnerable”) to the trauma that initiated them (e.g., using a time-line), to 
challenge the notion that these beliefs have always been, or will always be, components of 
their identity.  
Alongside the mediating role of self-consistency, this study replicated the previously 
reported relationship between trauma-centred identity and posttraumatic symptoms in British, 
and extended it to trauma survivors from Soviet cultures. Efficacious treatments that target 
trauma-identity in Western cultures, therefore, could also be successful with Soviet clients. 
However, future research must examine whether the trauma-identity and PTSD association, 
and its clinical implications, are relevant to other cultural groups. As for western and Soviet 
trauma survivors, given that trauma-centred identity is associated with posttraumatic 
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symptoms, the role of the trauma in clients’ identity should be attended to from the initial 
stages of case assessment and formulation. Second, appraisals of the self with relation to the 
trauma may have individual components (e.g., “I am a victim”) alongside communal ones 
(e.g., “I am unable to protect my child”). When gathering information on the impact of the 
trauma on identity, clinicians must consider clients’ self construal levels of independence/ 
interdependence. As seen in the present study, while British and Soviet participants were 
predominantly individualistic in their responses, they also provided a number of public and 
communal self-descriptions. Attending to clients’ valued roles and self aspects, both private 
and public ones, can enhance the case formulation (Tarrier, 2006), and may seem more 
relevant and engaging for the client. The resulting person-centred formulation could 
acknowledge interpersonal factors, for instance, others’ beliefs and roles, in the stages leading 
to, and maintaining, the PTSD (Tarrier & Humphries, 2003). Third, in the intervention stage, 
self-schema work and cognitive restructuring could be employed to challenge and modify 
individual or public self views associated with the trauma. The resulting cognitive updates may 
initiate changes in the meaning of the trauma or its sequelae (Lee, 2009). In the context of a 
trauma-centred identity, new meanings may be associated with the nature and content of the 
trauma memory, and with its appraised influence on one’s life story. Furthermore, the 
centrality of trauma events that are associated with feelings of shame and guilt has been found 
to be related to elevated levels of PTSD symptoms (Robinaugh & McNally, 2010). To enable 
the therapeutic identity-challenging where shame or guilt is present, it is recommended that 
clinicians provide a sense of psychological safety, for example, via the use of compassionate 
imagery and the development of self-soothing skills (Lee, 2009).  
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In summary, the relevance of current theoretical models of PTSD to non-Western 
populations had often been questioned (e.g., Bracken, 2002). The present study found similar 
relationships between posttraumatic symptoms, self-consistency and trauma-centred identity in 
British and Soviet participants. High levels of self-consistency are associated with lower levels 
of posttraumatic symptoms and trauma centrality; they also mediate the relationship between a 
trauma-centred self and PTSD. Therefore, the main clinical implication to draw from this 
study has to do with the protective role of self-consistency for both British and Soviets. Given 
this and the additional cross-cultural similarities seen in this research, these findings support 
the use of Western models of PTSD with members of Soviet cultural groups. However, further 
research is needed to test this clinically.  
4.6 Future Research 
 The present findings call for several lines of research. Primarily, the associations 
between self-consistency, PTSD and trauma-centred identity require additional investigation. 
This was the first study to examine the relationship between self-consistency and PTSD cross-
culturally, and in Soviets in particular. Future studies are needed to test the present findings in 
additional individualistic and collectivistic cultures. Next, given Locke’s (2006) findings 
whereby high self-consistency of negative personality traits was not associated with 
psychological well-being, it would be clinically relevant to explore whether self-consistency is 
protective for trauma survivors with negative premorbid self concepts. Research should also 
examine how the present variables relate with ones not addressed in this study, for example, 
the orientation of the trauma memory (independent/interdependent) conceptualised in the TCS 
(Jobson, 2009).  
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The finding that the Soviet sample exhibited similar levels of cultural independence/ 
interdependence as the British one suggests that cultural norms and preferences for 
individualism and collectivism are ever-changing. This emphasizes the need to continue to 
extend this line of research to different cultures, particularly to collectivistic ones that value 
interdependence, as they have been relatively less explored compared with individualistic 
cultures. Studies should aim to recruit members of collectivistic cultural groups living in their 
home countries, to exclude the extraneous impact of immigration and residing among 
Westerners. Such work will enable the extension and generalisability of findings to non-
Westerners.  
The three identity measures used in this study were mostly uncorrelated, and so they 
possibly target distinct components of the trauma identity construct. Given that trauma-centred 
identity is associated with PTSD, it is crucial to elucidate the nature of trauma-themed identity 
and to develop a conceptually clearer construct. To start, future research could examine and 
compare the construct validity and external validation of the three identity measures used here. 
Attention should also be given to the 10-item version of the TST, as it may be less accurate 
than the full scale. Additionally, seeing that this study was the first to employ the CES in a 
non-Western culture, further evidence is needed to enable the generalisability and the 
validation of the CES. Cross-cultural research may be enhanced by including independent 
raters to ascertain that participants’ transcripts are not identifiable in terms of cultural group. 
Lastly, future expansions of this study should measure factors that may impact on the 
development of a trauma-centred identity, such as socioeconomic status.  
Services offering assessment and treatment to trauma survivors from Western and non-
Western cultures could aid future cross-cultural trauma research by routinely administering 
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measures of trauma-identity. The information gathered will be valuable to further extend the 
results of the present investigation in the following directions. In terms of Western trauma 
survivors, the current finding regarding higher levels of trauma-centred identity in British 
survivors could be examined in further depth. As for non-Western survivors, the routine 
administration of trauma-centred identity measures could gradually provide information about 
posttraumatic changes to identity in different cultures. The data can also be used by the 
treating clinicians to identify clients’ maladaptive, trauma-related self definitions, which could 
later be challenged in the intervention stage as detailed above. This service-level practice may 
enhance professionals’ awareness to cultural differences in responses to trauma, and encourage 
clinicians to question the suitability of the commonly applied models of PTSD to the unique 
experience of their clients. Habitual data collation of this sort may ultimately shape policy, for 
instance, by initiating debates on services delivered to non-Western clients, or by enabling 
clients to voice their views to researchers and service providers.   
4.7 Conclusions 
A large body of evidence associates the concept of trauma-centred identity with PTSD 
(e.g., Berntsen et al., 2003). High levels of trauma centrality have been shown to relate to and 
to predict PTSD symptoms (e.g., Berntsen & Rubin, 2007). These findings had been replicated 
in clinical and non-clinical samples, in males and females, and across the lifespan. Events that 
are perceived as central to identity were shown to be influenced by cultural expectations and 
norms, although this subject received little empirical attention. A limited number of studies 
examined cultural differences in trauma-centred identity (e.g., Jobson & O’Kearney, 2006). 
Their findings suggested cultural differences; the impact of the trauma on survivors’ identity 
was significantly more pronounced in those from individualistic cultures compared with 
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members of collectivistic cultures. Identity consistency, which has also been shown to vary 
between cultures, is hypothesised by several prominent theories to have a causative role in the 
development of PTSD (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Jobson, 2009; 
Rubin et al., 2008). Self-consistency, while never empirically tested with relation to trauma-
centred identity across cultures, has been proposed to account for the cultural differences in 
trauma-centred identity (Jobson, 2009).   
This study set out to examine self-consistency, trauma-centred identity and 
posttraumatic symptoms in members of individualistic (British) and collectivistic (Soviets) 
cultures. Levels of self-consistency were similar across both groups. British participants had 
significantly higher levels of trauma-centred identity. Posttraumatic symptoms were positively 
correlated with trauma-centred identity. Increased self-consistency was significantly associated 
with fewer posttraumatic symptoms in the Soviet sample, and with lower levels of trauma-
centred identity in both groups. The relationship between trauma-centred identity and 
posttraumatic symptoms was mediated by levels of self-consistency. It appears from these 
findings that self-consistency may be a protective factor for those who experience trauma.  
Research into the role of self-consistency in coping with traumatic experiences must 
continue to expand cross-culturally. Enhancing the current understanding of how culture 
influences posttraumatic adjustment is of significant clinical importance, as nearly 5 million 
UK residents are from non-Western cultures. There is therefore a great need for additional 
research in this field to inform clinical interventions with non-Western survivors of trauma.  
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Appendix A 
Questionnaire Booklet 
 
 
Tel: 07582892415 
Email: tal.moore@uea.ac.uk 
Post: c/o Tal Moore, Doctorate  
Programme in Clinical Psychology 
Elizabeth Fry building 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich NR4 7TJ 
 
Instructions letter – paper pack  
 
 
This letter is followed by eight questionnaires. Some of the questionnaires ask about 
distressing events that happened to you. Please complete all the questionnaires in one sitting 
and in the order in which they appear. It should take about 30-45 minutes.  
When you finish the questionnaires, you will be entitled to enter the prize draw. You 
can enter the prize draw by writing your name and address in the small envelope. Please insert 
this small envelope, together with the completed questionnaires, in the large return envelope. 
When we receive the large return envelope, the questionnaires will be separated from the 
small envelope, and examined anonymously. After the prize draw at the end of the study, the 
remaining small envelopes will be destroyed unopened. 
If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact Tal Moore at 07582892415. 
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Part 1: Instructions 
Please indicate on the scale from 1 to 7 how accurately the following statements describe your ‘general 
self’ (please circle). 
1. I am affectionate 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
2. I am assertive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
3. I am competitive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
4. I am cynical 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
   
 
5. I am dominant 
 
1 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Not at all like myself 
   
 
Very much like myself 
6. I am impulsive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
   
 
7. I am protective 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
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8. I am relaxed 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
9. I am a victim 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
10. I am serious 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
11. I am talkative 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
12. I am tolerant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
13. I am trusting 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
14. I am defeated 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
15. I am influential 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
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16. I am secure 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
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Self Defining Memories 
 
Instructions 
A self-defining memory is a memory from your life that you remember very clearly, is 
important to you and leads to strong feelings, that may be either positive or negative, or 
both. It is the kind of memory that helps you to understand who you are and might be the 
memory you would tell someone else if you wanted that person to understand you in a 
more profound way. They are memories that you feel convey powerfully how you have 
come to be the person you currently are.  
Please briefly write down 5 self-defining memories.  
1._____________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
_________________________________  
2._____________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
_________________________________ 
3._____________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
_________________________________ 
4.______________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
_________________________________ 
5.______________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
__________ 
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Instructions 
Please think back upon the most stressful or traumatic event in your life and answer the following 
questions in an honest and sincere way, by circling a number from 1 to 5. 
1. This event has become a reference point for the way I understand new experiences. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Totally disagree  Totally agree 
 
2. I automatically see connections and similarities between this event and experiences in my 
present life. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Totally disagree  Totally agree 
 
3. I feel that this event has become part of my identity. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Totally disagree  Totally agree 
 
4. This event can be seen as a symbol or mark of important themes in my life. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Totally disagree  Totally agree 
 
5. This event is making my life different from the life of most other people. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Totally disagree  Totally agree 
 
6. This event has become a reference point for the way I understand myself and the world. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Totally disagree  Totally agree 
7. I believe that people who haven’t experienced this type of event think differently than I do.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Totally disagree  Totally agree 
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8. This event tells a lot about who I am. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Totally disagree  Totally agree 
 
9. I often see connections and similarities between this event and my current relationship 
with other people. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Totally disagree  Totally agree 
 
10. I feel that this event has become a central part of my life story. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Totally disagree  Totally agree 
 
11. I believe that people who haven’t experienced this type of event, have a different way of 
looking upon themselves than I have. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Totally disagree  Totally agree 
 
12. This event has coloured the way I think and feel about other experiences. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Totally disagree  Totally agree 
 
13. This event has become a reference point for the way I look upon my future. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Totally disagree  Totally agree 
 
14.  If I were to weave a carpet of my life, this event would be in the middle with threads 
going out to many other experiences. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Totally disagree  Totally agree 
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15. My life story can be divided into two main chapters: one is before and one is after this 
event happened. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Totally disagree  Totally agree 
 
16. This event permanently changed my life 
1 2 3 4 5 
Totally disagree  Totally agree 
 
17. I often think about the effects this event will have on my future. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Totally disagree  Totally agree 
 
18. This event was a turning point in my life. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Totally disagree  Totally agree 
 
19. If this event had not happened to me, I would be a different person today. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Totally disagree  Totally agree 
 
20. When I reflect upon my future, I often think back to this event. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Totally disagree  Totally agree 
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Tel: 07582892415                                                                                                                      
Email: Tal.Moore@uea.ac.uk                                          
Post: c/o Tal Moore, Clinical Psychology Doctorate Programme                                                           
Elizabeth Fry building, University of East Anglia                  
Norwich NR4 7TJ 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Part 1. 
Many people have lived through or witnessed a very stressful and traumatic event at some point in 
their lives. Below is a list of traumatic events. Put a tick in the box next to ALL of the events that have 
happened to you or that you have witnessed. 
 
(1)   □ Serious accident, fire, or explosion (for example, an industrial, farm, car, plane, or boating 
accident)  
(2)   □ Natural disaster (for example, cyclone, flood, tornado, hurricane, flood, or major earthquake) 
(3)   □ Non-sexual assault by a family member or someone you know (for example, being mugged, 
physically attacked, shot, stabbed, or held at gunpoint) 
(4)   □ Non-sexual assault by a stranger (for example, being mugged, physically attacked, shot, 
stabbed, or held at gunpoint) 
(5)   □ Sexual assault by a family member or someone you know (for example, rape or attempted rape) 
(6)   □ Sexual assault by a stranger (for example, rape or attempted rape) 
(7)   □ Military combat or war zone 
(8)   □ Sexual contact when you were younger than 18 with someone who was 5 or more years older 
than you (for example, contact with genitals, breasts) 
(9)   □ Imprisonment (for example, prison inmate, prisoner of war, hostage) 
(10) □ Torture  
(11) □ Life threatening illness 
(12) □ Other traumatic event 
 
(13) If you marked item 12, specify the traumatic event below. 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
(*) If you have not marked any of the above items, please think about the most stressful and traumatic 
event you have ever experienced and write it below. 
___________________________________________________________________ 
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(14) If you marked more than one traumatic event in Part 1, put a tick in the box below next to the 
event that bothers you the most. If you only marked one traumatic event in Part 1, mark the same one 
below. 
□ Accident  
□ Disaster  
□ Non-sexual assault by a family member or someone you know  
□ Non-sexual assault by a stranger  
□ Sexual assault by a family member or someone you know  
□ Sexual assault by a stranger  
□ Combat 
□ Sexual contact when you were younger than 18 with someone who was 5 or more years older  
□ Imprisonment  
□ Torture  
□ Life threatening illness 
□ Other  
 
In the lines below, briefly describe the traumatic event you marked above. 
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
______________________ 
 
Below are several questions about the traumatic event you just described above. 
 
(15) How long ago did the traumatic event happen? (circle ONE) 
 
1 Less than 1 month 
2 1 to 3 months 
3 3 to 6 months 
4 6 months to 3 years 
5 3 to 5 years 
6 More than 5 years 
 
 
For the following questions, circle Yes or No. 
  
During this traumatic event: 
 
(16) Were you physically injured?    YES  NO 
(17) Was someone else physically injured?  YES  NO 
Part 2. 
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(18) Did you think your life was in danger?     YES  NO 
(19) Did you think someone else’s life was in danger?       YES  NO   
   
(20) Did you feel helpless?        YES  NO 
(21) Did you feel terrified?            YES  NO 
 
Part 3. 
Below is a list of problems that people sometimes have after experiencing a traumatic event. Read each 
one carefully and circle the number (0-3) that best describes how often that problem has bothered you 
IN THE PAST MONTH. Rate each problem with respect to the traumatic event you described in Item 
14. 
0 Not at all or only one time 
1 Once a week or less/once in a while 
2 2 to 4 times a week/half the time 
3 5 or more times a week/almost always 
(22) Having upsetting thoughts or images about the traumatic 
event that came into your head when you didn’t want 
them to 
0 1 2 3 
(23) Having bad dreams or nightmares about the traumatic 
event 
0 1 2 3 
(24) Reliving the traumatic event, acting or feeling as if it 
was happening again 
0 1 2 3 
(25) Feeling emotionally upset when you were reminded of 
the traumatic event (for example, feeling scared, angry, 
sad, guilty, etc.) 
0 1 2 3 
(26) Experiencing physical reactions when you were 
reminded of the traumatic event (for example, breaking 
out in a sweat, heart beating fast) 
0 1 2 3 
(27) Trying not to think about, talk about, or have feelings 
about the traumatic event 
0 1 2 3 
(28) Trying to avoid activities, people, or places that remind 
you of the traumatic event 
0 1 2 3 
(29) Not being able to remember an important part of the 
traumatic event 
0 1 2 3 
(30) Having much less interest or participating much less 
often in important activities 
0 1 2 3 
(31) Feeling distant or cut off from people around you 0 1 2 3 
(32) Feeling emotionally numb (for example, being unable to 
cry or unable to have loving feelings) 
0 1 2 3 
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(33) Feeling as if your future plans or hopes will not come 
true (for example, you will not have a career, marriage, 
children, or a long life) 
0 1 2 3 
(34) Having trouble falling or staying asleep 0 1 2 3 
(35) Feeling irritable or having fits of anger 0 1 2 3 
(36) Having trouble concentrating (for example, drifting in 
and out of conversation, losing track of a story on 
television, forgetting what you read)  
0 1 2 3 
(37) Being overly alert (for example, checking to see who is 
around you, being uncomfortable with your back to the 
door, etc.) 
0 1 2 3 
(38) Being jumpy or easily startled (for example, when 
someone walks up behind you) 
0 1 2 3 
(39) How long have you been experiencing the problems that you reported above? (circle ONE) 
1 Less than 1 month 
2 1 to 3 months 
3 More than 3 months 
(40) How long after the traumatic event did these problems begin? (circle ONE) 
1 Less than 6 months 
2 6 or more months 
Part 4 
Indicate below if the problems you rated in Part 3 have interfered with any of the following areas in 
your life DURING THE PAST MONTH. Circle YES or NO. 
(41) Work      YES  NO 
(42) Household chores and duties    YES  NO 
(43) Relationships with friends     YES  NO 
(44) Fun and leisure activities     YES  NO 
(45) Schoolwork      YES  NO 
(46) Relationships with your family    YES  NO 
(47) Sex life      YES  NO 
(48) General satisfaction with life    YES  NO 
(49) Overall level of functioning in all areas of your life   
YES  NO 
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Instructions 
Below is not related to any event.  
Listed below are some symptoms or problems that people sometimes have. Please read each 
one carefully and decide how much the symptom bothered or distressed you in the last week, 
including today. Place a tick in the appropriate column. 
Depression Symptoms Not at all A Little Quite a bit Extremely 
1. Feeling low in energy, slowed 
down 
    
2. Blaming yourself for things     
3. Crying easily     
4. Loss of sexual interest or 
pleasure 
    
5. Poor appetite     
6. Difficulty falling asleep, staying 
asleep 
    
7. Feeling hopeless about future     
8. Feeling blue/ sad     
9. Feeling lonely     
10. Thoughts of ending your life     
11. Feeling of being trapped or 
caught 
    
12. Worrying too much about 
things 
    
13. Feeling no interest in things     
14. Feeling everything is an effort     
15. Feelings of worthlessness     
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Instructions 
How would you describe yourself? Below are ten lines, each beginning with “I am”. Please 
complete each of the lines with a short phrase. Do not write your name, we do not want to be 
able to identify you.  
 
I am __________________________________________________________ 
I am __________________________________________________________ 
I am __________________________________________________________ 
I am __________________________________________________________ 
I am __________________________________________________________ 
I am __________________________________________________________ 
I am __________________________________________________________ 
I am __________________________________________________________ 
I am __________________________________________________________ 
I am __________________________________________________________ 
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Part two: Instructions 
Please indicate on the scale from 1 to 7 how accurately the following statements describe how you 
are when you interact with your parent, friend or romantic partner (please circle).   
1. When I interact with my romantic partner, I am affectionate. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
     
2. When I interact with my friend, I am protective.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    
 
Very much like myself 
3. When I interact with my parent, I am defeated 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
4. When I interact with my romantic partner, I am talkative. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
5. When I interact with my romantic partner, I am influential. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
6. When I interact with my parent, I am a victim 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
7. When I interact with my friend, I am defeated 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
8. When I interact with my romantic partner, I am serious 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
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9. When I interact with my friend, I am dominant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
   
 
10. When I interact with my friend, I am secure 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
11. When I interact with my friend, I am a victim 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
   
 
12. When I interact with my romantic partner, I am secure 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
   
 
13. When I interact with my friend, I am affectionate  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
   
 
14. When I interact with my romantic partner, I am competitive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
15. When I interact with my parent, I am serious. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
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16. When I interact with my parent, I am trusting. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
17. When I interact with my romantic partner, I am protective 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
18. When I interact with my romantic partner, I am relaxed 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
19. When I interact with my friend, I am cynical 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
20. When I interact with my romantic partner, I am a victim 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
21. When I interact with my parent, I am cynical 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
22. When I interact with my friend, I am talkative 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
23. When I interact with my parent, I am competitive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
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24. When I interact with my friend, I am impulsive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
   
 
25.  When I interact with my romantic partner, I am cynical  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
26. When I interact with my parent, I am impulsive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
27. When I interact with my friend, I am serious 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
28. When I interact with my friend, I am assertive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
29. When I interact with my romantic partner, I am dominant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
30. When I interact with my parent, I am protective 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
31. When I interact with my parent, I am relaxed 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
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32. When I interact with my romantic partner, I am assertive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
   
 
33. When I interact with a friend, I am tolerant  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
34. When I interact with my parent, I am talkative 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
35. When I interact with my romantic partner, I am trusting 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
36. When I interact with my parent, I am influential. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
37. When I interact with a friend, I am competitive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
38. When I interact with  my parent, I am affectionate 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
39. When I interact with my parent, I am assertive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
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40. When I interact with my parent, I am dominant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
   
 
41. When I interact with my friend, I am influential. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
42. When I interact with my parent, I am secure 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
    
43. When I interact with my romantic partner, I am impulsive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
     
44. When I interact with my friend, I am trusting 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
   
 
45. When I interact with my parent, I am tolerant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
 
46. When I interact with my romantic partner, I am tolerant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
47. When I interact with my friend, I am relaxed 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
48. When I interact with my romantic partner, I am defeated 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all like myself    Very much like myself 
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Demographics Questionnaire 
 
Please provide the following information: 
Age_____________ 
How many years have you lived in the UK _____________ 
Nationality _____________ 
Gender: male/ female/ do not wish to disclose. 
 
Please state how hard you found the study:  
 
1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9       10 
        Not hard at all                                                                            Extremely hard  
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Contact details for prize draw and study findings 
Please write your name and contact address so we can send you the Ipod nano if you win the 
prize draw. 
 
Name: 
Address: 
 
 
If you wish to find out about the findings of this study, please write your email/postal address, 
and we will send you a short description of the study findings.  
Email/ postal address: 
 
 
Please note that your contact address and email address will be stored separately from the 
questionnaires and thus, will not be able to be linked. 
 
Please seal this sheet inside the small envelops and insert it to the large envelope together 
with the completed questionnaires 
 
 
Thank you 
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Appendix B 
Examples of Autobiographical Memories Provided by Participants 
Examples of memories coded as trauma-themed: 
“Despair at being involved in a car crash on the A47 bypass, two years ago, which led to 
someone losing their life. This wasn't my fault but the absolute fear I felt when the car trying 
to overtake me at about 90 mph lost control and somersaulted over the tail end of my car in to 
the field” (British female participant). 
“My daughter died when she was two and I remember very clearly going into the bedroom and 
finding that she had died. She had been ill for a year and was expected to die but it was still a 
shock when it happened” (British female participant).   
“Being involved in a motorcycle crash in my teens” (Soviet male participant). 
“In my childhood my friend and I were attacked by hooligans. I ran away leaving my friend 
behind. I didn’t think she’d come out of it alive” (Soviet female participant). 
Examples of memories coded as non-trauma-themed: 
“Finding Christmas presents hidden in a wardrobe, so dispelling the myth of Father Christmas” 
(British female participant). 
“Getting my brown belt in karate” (British male participant). 
“At the age of 8 I was sent to live with an English family for one month. It was my first trip 
abroad. I was alone in a foreign country, in a strange family” (Soviet male participant). 
“I am five, at my grandmother’s. Nice rug, warm, cosy, granny is sewing. I want to come back 
there” (Soviet female participant). 
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Appendix C 
Ethical Approval 
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Appendix D 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Tel: 07582892415                                                                                                             
Email: Tal.Moore@uea.ac.uk                             
Post: c/o Tal Moore, Clinical Psychology Doctorate Programme                                                           
Elizabeth Fry building, University of East Anglia                                                                                          
Norwich NR4 7TJ 
Study information sheet 
Invitation to participate in a study about distressing events, identity and culture 
My name is Tal Moore and I am a trainee clinical psychologist at the University of East Anglia 
(UEA). I am conducting a study about distressing events, identity and culture. This study is 
supervised by Clinical Psychologists Dr Laura Jobson and Dr Deirdre Williams from the UEA. We 
would like to invite you to participate in this study. Before you decide if you wish to participate, it is 
important that you understand the reasons for conducting the study and the sort of questions that 
are asked. Please read the following information carefully. Take time to decide whether or not you 
wish to take part. If you have any questions or would like to discuss this further please contact me. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The study aims to learn how distressing events affect people from different cultures. We would like 
to find out if people from different cultures (British and people from the former USSR) experience 
distressing events differently.  
Why should I be invited? 
You have been invited because you expressed an interest in the research and you are British or 
from the former USSR. We are hoping to include a total of 136 participants in the study. 
Do I have to take part? 
No. It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. Your participation is totally voluntary. If 
you choose to participate, you will be asked to complete the study questionnaires and return these 
back to us.  
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you choose to participate, you will be asked to complete 8 questionnaires in one sitting, and this 
usually takes about 30-45 minutes. You can choose to meet with a researcher to complete the 
questionnaires in-person, or you may complete the questionnaires online, or receive them by post 
in paper form. The questionnaires ask about distressing events that happened to you, about your 
views of yourself and your feelings over the past week. We also ask for your age, gender, 
nationality and length of time in the UK.  
Can I stop taking part if I change my mind? 
You can change your mind about participating before you send your completed questionnaires. If 
you chose to withdraw from the study you do not have to provide a reason and there will be no 
consequences. However, you would not be able to withdraw once you return your completed 
questionnaires.  
What if there is a problem? 
If you have concerns about any part of the study or wish to complain, please contact Tal Moore 
who is a Trainee Clinical Psychologist, using the details provided at the end of this form. 
If you remain unsatisfied you may contact Dr Laura Jobson at Email: L.Jobson@uea.ac.uk  or 
phone 01603 591158. 
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Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
Yes. All the collected data is anonymised: we do not ask you to write your name or address on the 
questionnaires, and your contact details will be separated from the questionnaires so that they will 
not be able to be linked. The data is stored securely: all paper copies of the questionnaires will be 
kept in a locked drawer and the information that we enter on the computer will be secured with a 
password. Identifiable data (i.e., participants’ names and contact details after they have been 
separated from the questionnaires) will only be available to the study researchers (Tal Moore, 
Laura Jobson and Deirdre Williams) and the study sponsor for audit/monitoring purposes. The 
data will be analyzed and described in the present study. Once the study is completed, all the 
information will be stored in a locked drawer at the University of East Anglia for 15 years, and then 
it will be disposed of securely, in line with the 1998 Data Protection Act.  
What are the possible risks of taking part? 
The study questionnaires ask about distressing events that happened to you. Research suggests 
that these sorts of questions do not in general pose risks to participants’ well-being. It is possible, 
however, that you may feel some distress during or following the study. If you do feel distressed 
during the study you may stop completing the questionnaires and decide not to return them to the 
researchers. If you feel distressed during or after the research then it is encouraged that you 
contact the first researcher Tal Moore, a Trainee Clinical Psychologist who is supervised by 
Clinical Psychologist Dr Laura Jobson. Alternatively, you may contact your local GP through NHS 
direct at 0845 4647, or the Samaritans helpline: 08457 90 90 90. 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
We hope that this research will improve our understanding of cultural differences in coping with 
distressing events. In addition, you will be entitled to enter a prize draw for a new Ipod nano. If you 
wish to enter the prize draw, you will be asked to enclose your name and address in a sealed 
envelope together with the questionnaires, or in a separate part of the online questionnaires. Your 
questionnaires will be recorded anonymously. After the prize draw, all participants’ names and 
addresses will be destroyed or erased.  
What will happen to the results of the study? 
The information collected will be written up as the first researcher’s thesis for the University of 
East Anglia. The information may also be written into an article to be published in a peer-reviewed 
journal. You will not be identified in any of these reports.  
Who is organising and funding the study? 
This study is organized by trainee clinical psychologist Tal Moore in collaboration with Dr Laura 
Jobson and Dr Deirdre Williams, and is funded by the University of East Anglia. 
Who has reviewed the study? 
This study received ethical approval by the Norfolk Research Ethics Committee.  
 
Thank you for reading this information. If decide to participate please read the instructions 
about how to complete the questionnaires. When you have finished, save your answers on 
the online form or use the attached envelope to post you paper questionnaires to the 
researcher. By returning the completed questionnaires online, in person or by post, you 
will be telling us that you decided to take part in the study. 
 
If you wish to find out about the findings of this study, you will be able to leave your postal 
or email address in the space provided in the “contact details for prize draw and study 
findings” form. 
 
 
 
For more information please contact Tal Moore, Tel: 07582 892 415, E-mail:tal.moore@uea.ac.uk, 
Post: Tal Moore, Clinical Psychology Doctorate Programme, Elizabeth Fry building, University of 
East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ. 
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Appendix E 
Study Advertisement 
 
 
 
An invitation to participate in a study about distressing events, identity and culture. 
 
Help us learn more about cultural differences  
in coping with distressing events! 
We are looking for: 
 People born in the UK, and  
 People who were born in the former USSR and currently 
live in the UK.  
Participants will be asked to complete questionnaires (in English or Russian), 
which take about 30-45 minutes.   
 
Those who take part in the study can enter a prize draw to win an ipod nano. 
 
For more information please contact Tal Moore - Trainee clinical psychologist at 
the University of East Anglia 
 
Email: Tal.Moore@uea.ac.uk 
Telephone: 07582892415 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this! 
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Appendix F 
Instructions Email 
 
Hello, 
 
This email contains a file attachment: “Participant Information Sheet” for you to read. 
 
After you have read this file, you may click on the following link and complete the study 
questionnaires: 
 
https://spreadsheets.google.com/spreadsheet/viewform?formkey=dHY3bFVpZ0lHWT
JfZ0N1Q0JPRTIwNGc6MQ 
 
Some of the questionnaires ask about distressing events that happened to you. Please complete 
all the questionnaires in one sitting and in the order in which they appear. It should take about 
30-45 minutes.  
 
When you finish the questionnaires, you will be entitled to enter the prize draw by typing your 
name and address in the space provided in the following link: 
 
https://spreadsheets.google.com/spreadsheet/viewform?formkey=dDktWm9pOHRVM
0h3SGg5ZkNxOXJyMWc6MQ 
 
 Your name and address will not be seen when the questionnaires are recorded.  
After the prize draw at the end of the study, your contact details will be erased. 
 
Thank you for your participation 
 
 
Tal Moore 
 
 
Tel: 07582892415 
Email: Tal.Moore@uea.ac.uk 
Post: c/o Tal Moore, Doctorate Programme in Clinical Psychology 
Elizabeth Fry building, University of East Anglia 
Norwich NR4 7TJ 
 
